US mission in Afghanistan: Doomed?

Published in The Daily Star, November 15, 2008

PRESIDENT Bush's decision in 2003 to attack Iraq, leaving the mission in Afghanistan incomplete, and the country's history are combining to produce the same results as the Soviet invasion in the backdrop of a resurgent Taliban and militancy that has risen alarmingly in recent times. The gloomy scenario has been brought into international attention by the Ambassadors of Great Britain and Russia in Kabul.

The British Ambassador Sir Shehard Cowper-Coles' assessment came to press when a secret telegram from the French Deputy Chief of Mission in Kabul, who had a one-to-one meeting with him on September 2nd, was leaked to the press. In the assessment of the British Ambassador, the “current situation is bad and getting worse; so is corruption and the Government has lost all trust” and that the regime of President Karzai is surviving because of foreign forces “who are slowing down and complicating and eventual exit from the crisis which will be dramatic”. Sir Shehard felt that the American strategy “is doomed to fail” and Britain should “dissuade the American presidential candidates from getting more bogged down”. Sir Shehard recommended a dictator to save Afghanistan.

The British Foreign Office, quite understandably, denied any truth in the leaked telegram. That notwithstanding, the Soviet Ambassador in Kabul gave an interview in October on similar lines. Ambassador Zamir Kabulov's views are more relevant because of his background. He worked for the KGB in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion. He was also an advisor in the 1990s to the UN peacekeeping envoy during the turbulent period in the mid 1990s before the Taliban captured power in Kabul. Ambassador Kabulov said that the US led mission in Afghanistan is committing the same mistakes as the failed Soviet invasion such as focusing on the cities leaving the countryside unattended where stirrings of opposition grew into full blown insurgency that they eventually failed to contain. The increasing number of troops that eventually reached 147,000 added to their unpopularity as they failed to understand Afghanistan's “irritative allergy” or a deep dislike for foreign occupation, which in the past led them to end all foreign occupation, including the British in the 19th century. According to Ambassador Kabulov, “the more foreign troops you have roaming the country, the more the irritative allergy toward them is going to be provoked." There are 20,000 troops, including 18,000 from US under Operation Enduring Freedom and 47,000 under International Security Assistance Force from 40 countries, mainly NATO members that includes 17,000 US troops. The crucial mistake Soviet Union made was to stay after changing the regime, one that the US has also repeated. Ambassador Kabulov concluded that the US mission would fail the same way the Soviet invasion did two decades ago.

Both Ambassadors have made compelling arguments that reflect ground realities where chaos and insurgency led by the Taliban has reached almost a crescendo, making the Karzai Government ineffective and the war on terror seriously threatened. Some members of NATO forces in Afghanistan have also spoken out publicly in similar ways. Outgoing British Commander Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith told a London newspaper, also in October, that military victory in Afghanistan “is neither feasible nor desirable”. Even the Bush administration officials in a recent secret meeting with officials of Senator Obama and Senator McCain have delivered the same grim message: the situation in Afghanistan is getting worse.

In contrast, the US with her international partners have invested a great deal to win the war on terror that in 7 years has helped Afghanistan achieve a democratic constitution; an elected President; an elected parliament, and in addition to substantial infrastructure development, a GDP now worth US$ 21.5 billion. Following improvement of security in Iraq, foreign Islamic militants have moved to Afghanistan making the region, in the words of Senator Obama, the new frontier in the war against terror. Leaving now would mean letting the Taliban win power militarily that would be unacceptable for obvious reasons. A change of US strategy in Afghanistan is therefore a must to win that war.

The main problem in such a review is of course how to deal with a resurgent Taliban. In July, President Bush signed a secret order to empower US troops in Afghanistan to carry out attacks by land inside Pakistan from bases in Afghanistan to take out Taliban sanctuaries without informing Pakistan. It suspected that Pakistan's military intelligence, the ISI, has been making earlier aerial attacks ineffective by giving the Taliban and Al Qaeda elements advance information. Unfortunately, this strategy is not working because the US led attacks inside Pakistan have failed to take out the sanctuaries, causing instead more death of innocent people in Pakistan. Further, it has strained USA-Pakistan collaboration without which the war on terror cannot be won in the region.

The US, to help rebuild Afghanistan, must deal with the resurgence of the Taliban by keeping Pakistan in the loop and taking into account what motivates Pakistan to back the Taliban. The Taliban was created by Pakistan and the US to contain the Soviets. The US left Afghanistan once the Soviets left, leaving the Pakistanis alone with 2 million Afghan refugees and deeply involved in Afghanistan in a manner where it was impossible for them to withdraw. Pakistan continued to assist the Taliban with arms and training and eventually helped them to power in Kabul.

Pakistan's support for the Taliban has also been influenced by security and territorial compulsion that require a friendly Government in Kabul. Since 1947, Pakistan and Afghanistan have been at odds over the drawing of the Durand Line. All Governments in Afghanistan have refused to accept this line as the boundary between the two countries by refusing to accept Pakistan as a successor state to the British rule. The fact that a portion of Afghanistan's major ethnic group, the Pashtuns, also lives in Pakistan makes it imperative for Pakistan to keep the Durand line intact. It can only be assured by a government in Kabul friendly towards her that led Pakistan to back the Taliban. Attempts to break the nexus were made when General Musharraf joined the US' war on terror, but these were at the lower level of Pakistan's intelligence who had built the nexus over many years; it never really withered away. The nexus has come to surface in a pronounced manner since Mushraff's departure. The new administration in USA should therefore use its influence in Kabul to take up Pakistan's concern over her territorial integrity vis-à-vis Afghanistan so that Pakistan does not have to depend on the Taliban to give her that assurance. The Pakistanis are also concerned over India's role in Afghanistan. Mutual antagonism towards Islamabad has historically drawn Kabul and New Delhi closer, increasing Pakistan's security concerns and her need for a friendly Government, like the Taliban, in Kabul. The US, that now has more leverage with New Delhi after the signing of the civil nuclear deal, should also use her influence in building greater and better trilateral cooperation involving India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

The ability of Islamic militant forces worldwide has weakened and within these elements, serious doubts have been raised about terrorism as a strategy. A move towards negotiating with these forces in Afghanistan at this point in time, with a new administration coming to office in Washington, may not be an idea to be dismissed hastily. Former US Ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke, speaking in New York University last month said it would be “a very good thing” if negotiating with some elements of the Taliban brought them to the political process while under Saudi initiative, elements of the Taliban and members of the Karzai Government have already met in Saudi Arabia. Afghan officials are also talking to the Taliban in Kabul. Writing in the current issues of Foreign Affairs, Barnett E Rubin and Ahmed Rashid (author of the incisive book 'Taliban: Militant Islam') have mentioned that the only way to stabilize Afghanistan is through “a major diplomatic initiative involving all the stakeholders” including Pakistan and Iran.

Unfortunately, both Senator McCain and president elect Obama have stated publicly that they would commit more troops to win the war on terror. President Bush has already signed 8,000 additional troops to arrive in Afghanistan in January and a request for 15,000 additional troops from General David McKiernan, the top American commander in Afghanistan, is pending. This could only intensify and complicate matters for the worse. The new US administration must also consider that the current violence is shaking the will of Europeans to continue to contribute troops to the NATO mission.

The new administration in Washington must seriously review the military option in favour of the political and diplomatic ones. Increasing US military presence to destroy the resurgent Taliban and other militants opposing the Karzai Government by force, a policy pursued with some success in Iraq, would only turn the predictions of the Russian and the British Ambassadors into prophecy. Also, Afghanistan will elect a new President next year. Hamid Karzai has not proved effective. Side by side with political and diplomatic efforts, the new US administration should also look for a replacement for Karzai, someone tougher and more effective.

The new administration must commit more funds for national building efforts in key areas of countering narcotics, strengthening governance and economic development, building infrastructure and jobs and humanitarian assistance while dealing with the major task of security through diplomacy and political maneuverings, not by increasing troops, for the better future of Afghanistan.