The tenure of Nazrul Islam that lasted for 14 months (May 1987-July 1988) was almost all in the midst of political upheaval in the country. Soon after he assumed office, the military government of General Ershad introduced a bill in Parliament in July, 1987 that provided military representation in the district councils. The AL walked out of Parliament on the issue and took politics to the street. The BNP that had not participated in the 1986 elections was already agitating against the Ershad Government. The political climate thus was extremely fluid and volatile where hartal was the order of the day.
At the Foreign Ministry, those of us who were working for the Foreign Minister and the Foreign Secretary or the Administration were spending our nights in the office to avoid walking the long way to office where there were also the dangers of falling in the hands of the hartal activists and being humiliated. Nazrul Islam was given an official house in Gulshan but he found it inconvenient to come from there to office on hartal days, although he was provided police escort. He moved early in his tenure to a house in Dhanmandi to be nearer to the Ministry. The heated political climate in the country made lives of all working for the civil bureaucracy difficult as we were left to fend for ourselves to attend office during these frequent hartals without failure.
At the height of these agitations, the military government declared emergency and announced fresh elections for March, 1988. The evening the announcement was made, I received a call from the Foreign Secretary to be at the office by 8pm. I was there earlier than 8pm and soon afterwards, the Foreign Secretary was there. He gave me a list of Ambassadors, mostly of the developed countries, and asked me to call them to office within the hour for a briefing on what led to the introduction of the emergency by the Foreign Minister. Soon, the Chief of Protocol M Mohsin arrived. The job was a protocol wing's job. But as the protocol officers were taking time to arrive, I was asked to do the job. M. Mohsin was aware that I was handling a job that his officers should have handed. I came to my room and started calling the Ambassadors one by one. When I called the Soviet Ambassador, he told me that he was in his pyjamas and had retired to his bed, in humour of course. I replied back that as the Foreign Minister would be briefing him and his colleagues on a very important national issue, he had no option but to come, assuring him that the Foreign Minister would not mind if he came in his pyjamas! M. Mohsin, sat across my table in a chair with his legs spread on another and watched me all the while, saying nothing. That started a relationship where I saw him closely and became aware of his qualities as a diplomat and a gentleman and learnt to respect him as one of the best officers in the Foreign Service cadre.
The Foreign Minister was at his best at occasions such as the one he addressed that evening. He briefed the Ambassadors and High Commissioners on an issue that was not particularly popular in a manner that did not bring critical comments from the floor. By his side was Nazrul Islam who was equally capable of holding his own and between them, they represented the Government that evening on a difficult issue in the best way possible. Many of us present there that evening did not accept the defense of the Foreign Minister for the declaration of emergency. Nevertheless we did not fail to admire the ability of HRC and Nazrul Islam to represent the Government on a very difficult and unpopular issue. There were present that evening among few Ambassadors, who despite the fact that the Ershad government was un-democratic, nevertheless backed him because of reasons of Cold War diplomacy of the period.
Ershad himself those days took the major decisions on foreign relations where the Foreign Ministry did not play much of a role. He worked out a relationship with the United States through the US Ambassadors in Dhaka among whom Howard Schaffer (1984-87) played a significant role. At that time, Ershad's brother-in-law AHG Mohiuddin was an important factor in many matters related to the Foreign Ministry and foreign policy. AGH as he was popularly known was a member of the erstwhile Pakistan Taxation Service of 1965 batch who was posted in the Bangladesh Embassy in Washington and later as the Deputy Permanent Representative/ Alternative Permanent Representative and finally as the Permanent Representative in New York during Ershad's 10 years long rule. He was encadred into the Bangladesh Foreign Service in 1981 after Ershad assumed power. In the entire period of Ershad's rule, AGH enjoyed a special status that did not commensurate with his seniority in the cadre.
The Permanent Mission in New York , after AGH was posted there was an alternate Foreign Ministry, more powerful than the Ministry itself in areas where it chose to exercise its influence. Where in all other Missions, Ambassadors/officers/staff were directly under the control and supervision of the Foreign Ministry, the Permanent Mission in New York was a power unto itself where AGH decided everything about the Mission, including posting and transfer of officers there. Although AGH exercised influence out of the ordinary, the good thing about him was he did not use his influence to put anyone in trouble. In fact, whenever he contacted the Ministry, it was invariably to help someone working for him at the Permanent Mission. He demanded loyalty and anyone who had ideas of his own had to move out prematurely from the Mission. Some of his officers and staff used his influence for good measure for their personal gains.
The President and AHG with obvious concurrence of the Foreign Minister placed the United States on top of the agenda. In order to reach the Congress effectively, they appointed a lobbyist for the first time in history of Bangladesh-US relations. I remember taking the contract to the residence of the Foreign Minister for his signature of a hartal morning under police escort. Nazrul Islam had little to do in negotiating the appointment of Bannerman (can't recollect his first name), who was a staffer of Senator Lugar, as the lobbyist for a hefty fee. That morning, visibly unhappy, he signed the contract on the dotted lines before handing the document to me to take to the Foreign Minister. Nevertheless, the pro-US policy was successful for the President. When Bangladesh became the first developing country to join the US led coalition for the Gulf War in 1990 at a time when the popular movement against Ershad has reached its peak, the US backed the President and was very unhappy when he was removed.
The political situation did not improve at all even after the March, 1988 elections because that time, both the mainstream political parties, the BNP and the AL, boycotted the elections. The elections led to an important change in the Foreign Ministry when Wajid Ali Khan Panni was appointed as the Deputy Foreign Minister. He was given the post as part of a political accommodation. The Deputy Foreign Minister was a friendly person and straightaway became close to the senior officers of the Ministry. Unfortunately, he did not get on well with the Foreign Secretary. Although at about that time, Nazrul Islam was trying his best to become friendly with the senior officers, there were a few who were not happy with him. Abdul Quayyum, an ex-PFS officer of the 1965 batch was one who was particularly unhappy with Nazrul Islam. Abdul Quayyum was a close friend of AHG or at least that was the perception that he gave everybody in the Ministry. Nazrul Islam was hell bent upon sending him out, no doubt because he thought Abdul Quayyum was reporting on him and the Ministry to AGH.
In the end Nazrul Islam had his way. Abdul Quayyum was named as Ambassador to Morocco despite his unwillingness to leave the Ministry. The news about Abdul Quayyum's agreement from the Moroccan Government was released to the press post haste without consulting him. The CV of Abdul Quayyum that was given to the press was an old one that mentioned he had two children where in fact he had more. An infuriated Abdul Quayyum stormed to the Foreign Secretary's room the day the news was released in the press and had an exchange that I listened to, with the door between my office and the Foreign Secretary's office party open, so as to be able to intervene in case that was necessary. It did not come to that but I could not believe that any officer of the Ministry could use language that was exchanged that day with the Foreign Secretary at the receiving end.
Wajed Ali Khan Panni and some of the senior officers eventually submitted a Summary for the President on the idiosyncrasies of Nazrul Islam. That was something quite unusual. Those days, the Foreign Secretary was the principal accounting officer of the Ministry. No summary could be sent to the President without the Foreign Secretary's signature. The rules notwithstanding, the Summary went to the President where it was received. The sad part was that the Foreign Secretary was blissfully unaware of the summary. What was equally sad was the fact that the senior officers who sent the Summary did not make the effort to sit with the Foreign Secretary to try and explain their frustrations with him. That action not only led to Nazrul Islam's unceremonious exit ultimately but also exposed to those who were determined to undermine the Foreign Ministry, its internal weakness.
Published in The Independent, December 10, 2009
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