THERE are important lessons to be learnt for Bangladesh from the Japanese experience with secret deals. While the LDP was in power for over five decades, except for a brief period in 1993, there was persistent accusation from the opposition with considerable public support that Japan had entered into secret deals with USA on security. However, the LDP led government was not willing to lend credence to those accusations and perceptions without being able to prove there were no secret deals. When the LDP lost power in the elections last September to the Democratic Party of Japan, one of the first tasks of the new Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada was to instruct the Foreign Ministry for a report about the secret deals. He gave his Ministry a year to come up with its findings, acknowledging the fact that it is easy to accuse about existence of secret deals but quite another thing to prove it.
In case of Bangladesh-India relations, there had been a gap in public perception and security agreements in the past. It started soon after our independence when Bangladesh and India signed the 25-year Friendship Treaty. While the governments at the time in New Delhi and Dhaka did not see any hidden agenda in the Treaty, the public view of the Treaty was quite different. There were many in Bangladesh who thought that the Treaty was an “unequal” one and a ploy by India to keep control over the country in the context of India's security priorities. The Treaty was allowed to lapse by Bangladesh in 1997 when the Awami League was in power. In matters of security, where two countries cannot reveal everything about the agreements that they have concluded to the public, there will always be a gap between reality and perception. Where politics is immature and where there is no consensus between the party in power and the party in opposition on such issues, the gap is natural. If there is none, then that would be extremely surprising.
It is thus because of the nature of dynamics related to security agreements that the difference has arisen between the ruling Awami League and the opposition BNP over the three security agreements that were signed during the recent visit of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to India. The opposition has accused the AL government of a “secret” deal and even went to the extent of accusing them of “selling” the country. The government has reacted to these accusations and used extremely harsh words to counteract. The Minister for LGRD who is also the government spokesman challenged the BNP to prove these accusations, particularly on the issue of the secret deal.
It is unfortunate that the BNP has brought this charge on such an important state visit of Sheikh Hasina that has potentials of being a watershed visit for furtherance of Bangladesh-India relations. But before one trashes it, it would be worthwhile to be a devil's advocate and look into why the BNP brought this accusation. More precisely, it would be useful to see if they have been given the cause for such a suspicion. The history of Bangladesh-India relation gives the BNP one reason for such a suspicion. The other important one is more recent and arises out of the events surrounding the arrest of the ULFA Chief Aravinda Rajkhowa and his associates. It happened just before Sheikh Hasina's visit. While the Indian media went gaga over the arrests, warmly expressing deep appreciation for Bangladesh's cooperation in apprehending them, Bangladesh declined any involvement in these arrests. When he was produced in the court in Gauhati, Rajkhowa expressed his anger and disappointment at Bangladesh, mentioning that the country had betrayed him. The Bangladesh government denied any involvement with the Home Minister categorical about her government's ignorance about the ULFA arrests. Thus for good reasons, the public in Bangladesh have remained confused about what really happened although many have no doubt that the ULFA insurgents were apprehended inside Bangladesh and handed to the Indian security. The government must thus bear responsibility for causing suspicion in the public mind on the issue for its dealing with the ULFA arrests was clumsy and not transparent.
The three agreements related to security cooperation signed during the visit of Sheikh Hasina, coming in the wake of lack of transparency with the ULFA arrests, are good enough reasons to conclude that the two countries have decided at the highest level for deep cooperation on security matters. The security cooperation is no doubt the correct thing to do for terrorists, wherever they are, are enemies of everybody because they kill innocent people. Such cooperation will also benefit Bangladesh by improving its image internationally after being branded as a country seething with extremist elements during the last BNP tenure. Bangladesh has recently been left out of the list of 14 countries whose nationals have been listed for extra security checks after the US imposed new and enhanced security for aircrafts flying to the United States following the failed attempt by a Nigerian to blow a Northwest airlines aircraft just short of landing in Detroit on Christmas day.
In between the government's perfect score to itself and the opposition's zero, the visit has laid the groundwork for significant improvement of Bangladesh-India relations. However, the key to that happening will depend on how successfully the government is able to remove the doubts that the opposition has inserted, particularly over the security agreements and the accusation of a “secret deal.” The best way to do that would be for the Awami League to open dialogue with the BNP. However, given the acrimony between the two, that is impossible. The only other way that may help remove the doubts partially would be to place the agreements in Parliament for public knowledge. In fact, article 147 (A) makes it incumbent upon the government to do so. The government should use the constitutional requirement to tell the nation whether it had or did not have anything to do with the arrests of the ULFA leaders. If not, it should explain why the Indian media did not seem to have any doubts about Bangladesh's hands in the arrests. It should also present the details of the security related agreements. That could lift doubts over the visit's outcome.
The “secret deal” notwithstanding, the Prime Minister's comment about lack of Indian generosity that she had made in a speech during the visit has also created problem for the government to explain the positive outcome of the visit. The Foreign Minister recently said that Bangladesh is seeking to sign an “ad hoc” deal on Teesta water sharing because a long term deal would need hydrological data, which will be time consuming. Why could this not have happened during the visit? The Indians could also have made a positive gesture on Tipaimukh, perhaps abandoned it altogether given Bangladesh's concessions on use of the ports and commitment on the extremely important issue of security. The Indians promised 250 MW of electricity which is a commercial deal while the US $1 billion is a credit line, not unilateral concession. One cannot help thinking of what a little bit of “Gujral Doctrine” could have done to Bangladesh-India relations as this point in time.
Published in the Daily Star, January 30, 2010
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