Foreign policy is increasingly becoming more and more crucial for a country's development as traditional national boundaries fall all around us under the pressure of globalization. In all countries, foreign policy formulation and its implementation are given extremely serious consideration and dealt with professionalism that is constantly being reviewed for higher standard. In Bangladesh , unfortunately we have not treated foreign affairs with the seriousness that it deserves and implementation mechanism makes our foreign policy handling anything but professional where the Foreign Ministry competes with a number of other Ministries/agencies in an environment that is not always cooperative.
Apart from the institutional weaknesses involved on the Government side, Bangladesh also suffers from the lack of organizations in the private sector that deal with foreign policy issues and render assistance to the Government in articulating the foreign policy issues in a coherent manner where all stake holders are brought into the equation. In any world capital, there are are many such organizations or think tanks. In Dhaka, only recently the Centre for Foreign Affairs Studies (CFAS) was created with the objective to fill this void.
In Dhaka at this point in time, there are a very large number of retired professional Ambassadors who have spent years in the area of formulation and implementation of Bangladesh's foreign policy. But there is no mechanism or little at the moment to bring their experiences into the loop. CFAS , in which I am a Director, has been envisaged to do this. This blog , an experimental one, has been designed to encourage others with background similar to mine to do so , so that we can together create a broad forum for exchange of thoughts and ideas with the intention to help the Government in the professional formulation and implementation of Bangladesh's foreign policy.
My blog is interactive, I would welcome readers' views on articles that I have posted and would post in future. Depending on what interest this blog creates, I have an intention to welcome issues from the readers for discussion on this blog site.
Showing posts with label foreign policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label foreign policy. Show all posts
Saturday, September 27, 2008
Saturday, May 17, 2008
Our foreign policy and the foreign ministry
Published in The Daily Star, May 17, 2008
RETIRED Ambassadors were unanimous on two issues in a Round Table (RT) organized by The Daily Star (TDS) and the Centre for Foreign Affairs Studies (CFAS) recently. First, foreign policy is not important in governance in Bangladesh. Second, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Bangladesh is “the weakest in the world”. It is not that these apprehensions are new. People informed on these issues have known these for a long time.
What is new and important is that this RT has brought foreign policy and the MFA into focus at a time when it is in our national interest to do so. Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, international relations are being rewritten faster than most nations can keep pace. Globalization and 9/11 have added new dimensions in international politics that nations have to adapt on a continuous basis for furthering national interests, making successful conduct of foreign policy crucial to all Governments. As a consequence of it all, Foreign Ministries all over the world have gained more power and influence. The TDS-CFAS RT in this context is a timely warning that Bangladesh is harming its own national interests by going against the trend.
It is a pity that we find ourselves in this situation today. We were liberated by blood in 1971 at a time when international law did not favour liberation by exercise of the right of self-determination. It was sheer merit of our cause, heroism of our people and the genocide of the Pakistani Army that swept world opinion in our favour when such was not the case in similar efforts in Sri Lanka and Nigeria where the Biafran struggle dissipated. Immediately after our liberation, it was because of our successful foreign policy that we swiftly became members of the UN, OIC and other world bodies, and established bilateral relations with most of the countries of the world. The MFA successfully charted the course for the nation that allowed Bangladesh safe landing and acceptance in the committee of nations. By 1979, we won a seat at the UN Security Council defeating Japan. In 1981, we came close to becoming the President of the UN General Assembly, a position we lost to Iraq by a coin toss after a tie on the votes cast.
By the time President Ershad usurped power, foreign policy and MFA were on the decline. One major reason for this is interesting; in the period immediately after liberation, when foreign policy was important, MFA officials led by the ex-Pakistan Foreign Service (PFS) officers were enjoying both recognition and prominence. The elite members of the ex-Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) were at that time in particular threat from the politicians. Some of the senior members of this service made an informal proposal to the ex-PFS officers in the MFA to form a Foreign Service Cadre together that was snubbed by the latter on the principle of inter seniority. That was a mistake for by the time Ershad came, these ex-CSP officers were very powerful. In fact, some senior ex-CSP officers helped Ershad overthrow the elected Government of Justice Sattar and became very close to him. Ershad disliked the Foreign Service that these ex-CSP officers used to full measure. They systematically destroyed the MFA, dividing the entire gamut of foreign relations into diplomatic, aid, trade, consular and other components, and distributing all except the diplomatic to a number of Ministries, Division and agencies and incorporated the changes into the Rules of Business.
The MFA and foreign policy had thus been relegated to the backseat by the time Ershad fell. Elected Governments that returned in 1991 carried forward the trend although our national interests required greater attention and importance to foreign policy to adjust to the new and emerging realities of a post Cold War world. While other countries strengthened their Foreign Ministry to meet new challenges that also opened new opportunities, we weakened it. We just did not allow foreign affairs to be shared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs together with a number of other Ministries; no effort was made to set up any mechanism for coordination. As one retired Ambassador commented at the TDS-CFAS RT, our foreign policy had become a hydra-headed creature without focus. Those in charge were happy to weaken the MFA and did not care or consider they were harming our national interests.
MFA under elected Governments thus was captain of a ship where its crews owed it no loyalty. It was therefore only logical that during this period we really had no foreign policy but a series of reactions to situations, mostly initiated at the instruction of the Prime Minister's Office. In the Missions, Ambassadors were as helpless as MFA in the country. As Ambassador to Japan, I was picking a lot of information from newspapers that I read on the internet on what the ERD or other economic Ministries were doing with Japan so as not to be embarrassed with the host Government as it was seldom that these Ministries kept me informed on developments. Left without substance in formulating and implementing foreign policy, MFA came up with high sounding policies like Economic Diplomacy during the AL tenure from 1996-2001; the so called Look East policy of the BNP Government and now the Ten Points Policy of the Caretaker Government. These policies have no concept papers. They have not been formulated through consultations with stakeholders and just been drawn out of the hat! To complicate matters, MFA often tried to first guess the mind of the Prime Minister and important officials at the PMO to deal with foreign policy issues. As Foreign Minister, Morshed Khan was aware that the Prime Minister had reservation about India. Instead of attempting to remove these reservations, he built upon it to be on her right side. In a now well-known tirade, he humiliated India at a Seminar in 2004 in unbelievable language to win the PM's attention. It is therefore no wonder that while India is for geopolitical and other reasons our most important neighbor; we do not have an India policy. In fact, substantive matters with India are not dealt by the MFA and often Ministries who deal with these issues, keep the MFA in darkness! We have not demarcated our maritime boundary with India. We have failed to uphold our best interests in multilateral economic negotiations where our performance at WTO negotiations, led by the Commerce Ministry, was so miserable that we were officially extended support by the UN to develop the negotiating skills of those who represent us there, skills available to MFA officers but not used. The sum total of neglect to foreign affairs and weakening the MFA has marginalized Bangladesh. We have no articulated and coordinated policy on issues as critical as climate change and global warming, on our interests in the WTO, on how to deal with India, etc.
The MFA, sadly, has helped this process rather than stand against it. Those in leadership role in the Ministry opted for their personal interests, like promotions and postings instead of opposing the efforts of those in power to relegate foreign affairs into the back drawer and make MFA weak. They allowed influx of army officers whose seniority destroyed the morale of the directly recruited officers. They also failed to oppose for fear of upsetting the Prime Minister and the PMO, wrong decisions taken at the latter's behest like the NAM Chairmanship in 1998 and Salauddin Qader Chowdhury's nomination for the OIC Secretary General's post in 2004 which given to any other candidate of MFA's choice could have won Bangladesh the post.
The need now is to reverse this process and allow the MFA to play a major role in formulating and implementing the country's foreign policy for the sake of Bangladesh. This is the trend worldwide and therefore is nothing new. An example of how MFA functions elsewhere was given at the TDS-CFAS RT. One Ambassador who was High Commissioner in India said at the RT that after he and the then Indian Finance Minister had fixed the latter's visit to Dhaka, the Finance Minister called the High Commissioner to inform him that he was embarrassed to cancel the visit because the Joint Secretary of the Bangladesh Division at the Indian External Affairs Ministry thought the dates were not suitable. Another retired Ambassador gave the example of Brazil where their MFA is the government within the government, a trend that most nations are now following in one degree or another.
It is simply our national interest that requires functions of aid, external trade and expatriate welfare to be given to the MFA together with the coordinating role for foreign policy related functions now being handled by other Ministries. The former NBR Chairman Badiur Raman made a very good case of this by stating in a talk show that with less than one digit dependence on foreign aid in our development needs, it is a disgrace that we have a Division called the ERD. In arguing the case of the Foreign Ministry, it may help us to bear in mind that in implementing foreign policy, diplomacy is of essence. Diplomacy is a specialized profession; the longer time one spends in this profession, the better that individual gets and the better that individual serves the country. The diplomatic cadre in Bangladesh works under the MFA. By bringing foreign policy related functions to the MFA, the country will have professionals dealing with such matters. Why would we do otherwise?
The Foreign Ministry has deteriorated over the years of neglect in its cadre potentials. To take the extra functions, the diplomatic cadre must be expanded by inducting officers from other Ministries and also from the private sector. Efforts must be made to attract people with special qualifications. Our expats in developed countries could be a potential source. Training, specialization and language skills must be made the key elements of the expanded Foreign Service cadre. Within these parameters, we should pursue clearly set out foreign policy goals that are achievable.
The biggest challenge to evolving a foreign policy of Bangladesh to serve the best interests of the country will be to successfully bring the stakeholders such as the political parties, business groups, and civil societies into the loop in the process of formulation of foreign policy. Once Parliament is in place, the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs should be given a major role in foreign policy formulation where bipartisanship of political parties in approaching foreign policy issues should be made indispensible. Finally, under the elected Government, the country must have a Foreign Minister with background and qualifications for the job that we did not have in the 15 years of elected Government for which the country has suffered. The icing on the cake must come from the Prime Minister who must be the country's number one diplomat by taking a proactive and knowledge based interest in foreign policy for which the bureaucratic walls that the PMO has created in the last 15 years should fall in favour of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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What is new and important is that this RT has brought foreign policy and the MFA into focus at a time when it is in our national interest to do so. Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, international relations are being rewritten faster than most nations can keep pace. Globalization and 9/11 have added new dimensions in international politics that nations have to adapt on a continuous basis for furthering national interests, making successful conduct of foreign policy crucial to all Governments. As a consequence of it all, Foreign Ministries all over the world have gained more power and influence. The TDS-CFAS RT in this context is a timely warning that Bangladesh is harming its own national interests by going against the trend.
It is a pity that we find ourselves in this situation today. We were liberated by blood in 1971 at a time when international law did not favour liberation by exercise of the right of self-determination. It was sheer merit of our cause, heroism of our people and the genocide of the Pakistani Army that swept world opinion in our favour when such was not the case in similar efforts in Sri Lanka and Nigeria where the Biafran struggle dissipated. Immediately after our liberation, it was because of our successful foreign policy that we swiftly became members of the UN, OIC and other world bodies, and established bilateral relations with most of the countries of the world. The MFA successfully charted the course for the nation that allowed Bangladesh safe landing and acceptance in the committee of nations. By 1979, we won a seat at the UN Security Council defeating Japan. In 1981, we came close to becoming the President of the UN General Assembly, a position we lost to Iraq by a coin toss after a tie on the votes cast.
By the time President Ershad usurped power, foreign policy and MFA were on the decline. One major reason for this is interesting; in the period immediately after liberation, when foreign policy was important, MFA officials led by the ex-Pakistan Foreign Service (PFS) officers were enjoying both recognition and prominence. The elite members of the ex-Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) were at that time in particular threat from the politicians. Some of the senior members of this service made an informal proposal to the ex-PFS officers in the MFA to form a Foreign Service Cadre together that was snubbed by the latter on the principle of inter seniority. That was a mistake for by the time Ershad came, these ex-CSP officers were very powerful. In fact, some senior ex-CSP officers helped Ershad overthrow the elected Government of Justice Sattar and became very close to him. Ershad disliked the Foreign Service that these ex-CSP officers used to full measure. They systematically destroyed the MFA, dividing the entire gamut of foreign relations into diplomatic, aid, trade, consular and other components, and distributing all except the diplomatic to a number of Ministries, Division and agencies and incorporated the changes into the Rules of Business.
The MFA and foreign policy had thus been relegated to the backseat by the time Ershad fell. Elected Governments that returned in 1991 carried forward the trend although our national interests required greater attention and importance to foreign policy to adjust to the new and emerging realities of a post Cold War world. While other countries strengthened their Foreign Ministry to meet new challenges that also opened new opportunities, we weakened it. We just did not allow foreign affairs to be shared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs together with a number of other Ministries; no effort was made to set up any mechanism for coordination. As one retired Ambassador commented at the TDS-CFAS RT, our foreign policy had become a hydra-headed creature without focus. Those in charge were happy to weaken the MFA and did not care or consider they were harming our national interests.
MFA under elected Governments thus was captain of a ship where its crews owed it no loyalty. It was therefore only logical that during this period we really had no foreign policy but a series of reactions to situations, mostly initiated at the instruction of the Prime Minister's Office. In the Missions, Ambassadors were as helpless as MFA in the country. As Ambassador to Japan, I was picking a lot of information from newspapers that I read on the internet on what the ERD or other economic Ministries were doing with Japan so as not to be embarrassed with the host Government as it was seldom that these Ministries kept me informed on developments. Left without substance in formulating and implementing foreign policy, MFA came up with high sounding policies like Economic Diplomacy during the AL tenure from 1996-2001; the so called Look East policy of the BNP Government and now the Ten Points Policy of the Caretaker Government. These policies have no concept papers. They have not been formulated through consultations with stakeholders and just been drawn out of the hat! To complicate matters, MFA often tried to first guess the mind of the Prime Minister and important officials at the PMO to deal with foreign policy issues. As Foreign Minister, Morshed Khan was aware that the Prime Minister had reservation about India. Instead of attempting to remove these reservations, he built upon it to be on her right side. In a now well-known tirade, he humiliated India at a Seminar in 2004 in unbelievable language to win the PM's attention. It is therefore no wonder that while India is for geopolitical and other reasons our most important neighbor; we do not have an India policy. In fact, substantive matters with India are not dealt by the MFA and often Ministries who deal with these issues, keep the MFA in darkness! We have not demarcated our maritime boundary with India. We have failed to uphold our best interests in multilateral economic negotiations where our performance at WTO negotiations, led by the Commerce Ministry, was so miserable that we were officially extended support by the UN to develop the negotiating skills of those who represent us there, skills available to MFA officers but not used. The sum total of neglect to foreign affairs and weakening the MFA has marginalized Bangladesh. We have no articulated and coordinated policy on issues as critical as climate change and global warming, on our interests in the WTO, on how to deal with India, etc.
The MFA, sadly, has helped this process rather than stand against it. Those in leadership role in the Ministry opted for their personal interests, like promotions and postings instead of opposing the efforts of those in power to relegate foreign affairs into the back drawer and make MFA weak. They allowed influx of army officers whose seniority destroyed the morale of the directly recruited officers. They also failed to oppose for fear of upsetting the Prime Minister and the PMO, wrong decisions taken at the latter's behest like the NAM Chairmanship in 1998 and Salauddin Qader Chowdhury's nomination for the OIC Secretary General's post in 2004 which given to any other candidate of MFA's choice could have won Bangladesh the post.
The need now is to reverse this process and allow the MFA to play a major role in formulating and implementing the country's foreign policy for the sake of Bangladesh. This is the trend worldwide and therefore is nothing new. An example of how MFA functions elsewhere was given at the TDS-CFAS RT. One Ambassador who was High Commissioner in India said at the RT that after he and the then Indian Finance Minister had fixed the latter's visit to Dhaka, the Finance Minister called the High Commissioner to inform him that he was embarrassed to cancel the visit because the Joint Secretary of the Bangladesh Division at the Indian External Affairs Ministry thought the dates were not suitable. Another retired Ambassador gave the example of Brazil where their MFA is the government within the government, a trend that most nations are now following in one degree or another.
It is simply our national interest that requires functions of aid, external trade and expatriate welfare to be given to the MFA together with the coordinating role for foreign policy related functions now being handled by other Ministries. The former NBR Chairman Badiur Raman made a very good case of this by stating in a talk show that with less than one digit dependence on foreign aid in our development needs, it is a disgrace that we have a Division called the ERD. In arguing the case of the Foreign Ministry, it may help us to bear in mind that in implementing foreign policy, diplomacy is of essence. Diplomacy is a specialized profession; the longer time one spends in this profession, the better that individual gets and the better that individual serves the country. The diplomatic cadre in Bangladesh works under the MFA. By bringing foreign policy related functions to the MFA, the country will have professionals dealing with such matters. Why would we do otherwise?
The Foreign Ministry has deteriorated over the years of neglect in its cadre potentials. To take the extra functions, the diplomatic cadre must be expanded by inducting officers from other Ministries and also from the private sector. Efforts must be made to attract people with special qualifications. Our expats in developed countries could be a potential source. Training, specialization and language skills must be made the key elements of the expanded Foreign Service cadre. Within these parameters, we should pursue clearly set out foreign policy goals that are achievable.
The biggest challenge to evolving a foreign policy of Bangladesh to serve the best interests of the country will be to successfully bring the stakeholders such as the political parties, business groups, and civil societies into the loop in the process of formulation of foreign policy. Once Parliament is in place, the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs should be given a major role in foreign policy formulation where bipartisanship of political parties in approaching foreign policy issues should be made indispensible. Finally, under the elected Government, the country must have a Foreign Minister with background and qualifications for the job that we did not have in the 15 years of elected Government for which the country has suffered. The icing on the cake must come from the Prime Minister who must be the country's number one diplomat by taking a proactive and knowledge based interest in foreign policy for which the bureaucratic walls that the PMO has created in the last 15 years should fall in favour of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Friday, August 5, 2005
Foreign policy of the BNP government: Lost Opportunities
Published in The New Age, August 5, 2005
Sadly, where potentials were immense to take the country forward by successful management of foreign policy, under the BNP-government, Bangladesh lost her international credibility as a liberal Muslim democracy and has instead become identified as a fundamentalist Muslim state, writes M Serajul Islam
The international situation presented the incumbent BNP-led government a good opportunity to establish Bangladesh as a Muslim-majority country with a liberal democracy. Success in establishing that credential would have gone a long way in improving Bangladesh’s image problem that has marginalised the country in the present international context. Bangladesh’s population of 145 million makes it the third largest Muslim country and among the 10 top-most populous nations of the world –– figures not to be taken lightly. Yet due to a combination of political and foreign policy failures, Bangladesh finds herself on the sidelines of international politics.
The aftermath of 9/11: BNP came to office shortly after 9/11, the event that dramatically altered most major parameters of international politics. Islam came at the centre stage for both right and wrong reasons. Nations tailored their foreign policies to adjust, accommodate or react to the event of the millennium. Bangladesh was presented with heaven-sent opportunities to benefit from the new realities in international politics as a liberal Islamic country. Bangladesh could have used her liberal Islamic traditions to fit into the changed scenario like hand into the glove. Further, the BNP had as its ally the Islamic parties, notably the Jamaat which placed it in a good position to tackle nascent Islamic terrorism. Also, the post of the secretary-general of the OIC came up for selection/election soon after the BNP came to power. A proper handling of the Jamaat, in turn Islamic fundamentalism, together with success in OIC would have won Bangladesh support of the developed nations as well as leadership of the Islamic world, making her position as a liberal Muslim country enviable among the developing nations of the world.
Failure to handle the Jamaat and the Islamists was a political failure and thus not a foreign policy matter although had that happened, the foreign policy managers would have had a good handle to work successfully in pursuing Bangladesh’s foreign policy goals.
The OIC debacle: The loss of the OIC election was however a foreign ministry failure. The post became almost Bangladesh’s in the year 2000 when then speaker and former foreign minister Humanyun Rashid Chowdhury was the candidate. The Saudis, whose influence in such matters is unquestioned, committed support to Chowdhury till at the last moment when the king of Morocco made a personal request to the king of Saudi Arabia to give then Moroccan incumbent OIC secretary general Larakki an extension. As the Saudis had extended Bangladesh support earlier, and as the request for Larakki was for one monarch to another that could not be declined, the Saudis requested Bangladesh to withdraw with the tacit understanding that they would unequivocally support Bangladesh in 2004.
With that background, the foreign ministry must have known too well how important it was for Bangladesh to win the secretary general’s post. In effect, however, the foreign ministry failed to bring home the crucial objective. The candidature of Salauddin Quader Chowdhury was a mistake because he did not have the credentials. Furthermore, his candidature ran into deep trouble in the country from the Awami League as was predictable. That gave the Saudis and others, who were favourably disposed towards Bangladesh in 2000, an excuse from actively supporting her candidature. The foreign ministry, instead of pointing out the weakness of the candidature, played along with it as it came from the office of the prime minister. Furthermore, the ministry, in the two years or so it ran the campaign, and spent crores for it, never either found out the lack of support for the candidate or having found it, deliberately fed the country wrong information about Bangladesh’s prospects. The foreign minister toured Turkey, who ultimately got the post, just two months before the OIC Summit that elected the secretary general and told the nation upon return that the post was as good as in Bangladesh’s pocket. On the eve of his departure for the summit, he told reporters at the airport that Bangladesh had commitment of 27 countries, just 2 votes short of an absolute majority. In contrast, Bangladesh lost the election poorly winning just 12 votes. Earlier, Malaysia approached Bangladesh to compromise in their favour, seeing that the Turkish candidate was surging ahead, and offered Bangladesh bilateral advantage that was scorned.
Thus Turkey, where the Islamists are in power, won the post handsomely while Bangladesh, where the Islamists just have a very minor share of power, lost badly and in the process, Bangladesh just not lost a post that has so much importance in the post 9/11 world, she also lost her natural advantage as a predominantly Muslim country with liberal democratic traditions which would have opened for the country a rich harvest of opportunities. The loss of the OIC post started Bangladesh’s slide in international politics under the BNP-led government.
India bashing: That slide became prominent in the region, particularly with India, Bangladesh’s most important neighbour and also with most of her development partners. With India, the BNP started on the wrong foot, taken deliberately and un-diplomatically. Any party in power in Delhi prefers the Awami League for reasons embedded in Bangladesh’s war of liberation. That notwithstanding, the BJP under then Indian prime minster Vajpayee had a different perspective of India’s neighbours with whom the prime minister was eager to mend fences. In that spirit, Vajpayee was the first international leader to congratulate Begum Zia on BNP’s election victory. That message was kept pending till a similar message from Pakistan was received. Then, Vajpayee proposed to send his most trusted aide, Brojesh Misra, to Bangladesh as his special envoy which too was not announced till Pakistan named her special envoy. That start sent India the wrong signal.
The foreign ministry thereafter handled Bangladesh’s relations with India by taking the cue from the political leadership. The diatribe by the foreign minister against India while speaking at the Enterprise Institute in presence of the Indian High Commissioner was an example of that approach. Then when India postponed participation in the 13th SAARC Summit, the foreign secretary matched his minister in criticising India in harsh and undiplomatic language.
It is true that India is not always a good neighbour and Bangladesh has reasons to be unhappy with her. That notwithstanding, the foreign policy managers of Bangladesh should not forget that India gave refuge to 10 million Bangladeshis in 1971 when the Pakistani army was killing Bangladeshis indiscriminately. Further, India sacrificed a large number of her troops in defeating Pakistan in 1971 that ended Pakistan’s occupation of Bangladesh. Finally, today India is a major player on the international stage and no matter what perception Bangladesh holds of India, the country must live with India and conduct relations with her with diplomatic and intellectual skills. Instead of acknowledging those realities and developing an India policy accordingly, the foreign ministry often preferred to deal with India through the media and chose India bashing in the media as a strategy where the foreign minister spared no opportunity to accuse India in the media in a manner that were best handled through diplomatic channels. The India bashing policy adopted by the foreign ministry helped to deteriorate Bangladesh-India relations to an all-time low.
The unprofessional approach taken by the foreign ministry also allowed other ministries of the government to deal with India by-passing the foreign ministry that often saw them contradicting one another. Consequently, the foreign ministry was unable to focus on the substantive issues in Bangladesh-India relations such as trade, transit, use of her ports and sale of gas, if she has the extra amount, to create for India a stake in Bangladesh. New developments also came into play of late vis-à-vis India such as India’s desire to become a permanent member of the UN security council and win the UN secretary-general’s post, aspirations that are taken seriously in view of India’s emergence as a major power in world politics. In conducting relations with India, the foreign ministry did not take most of the above realities into consideration and emphasised too much upon sovereign equality. The foreign ministry sometimes worked against those interests, and also consciously or unconsciously helped emphasise a preconceived notion held politically that India is out to harm Bangladesh’s sovereignty for pleasing the political leadership. The foreign ministry thus failed to provide the proper direction for a professional approach to Bangladesh-India relations.
Development partners: Bangladesh’s relations with her development partners have also shown little improvement. The United States became too busy with the war on terror. Bangladesh did not matter to them in that context as she was not involved directly or indirectly with major international terrorist groups. The US did express concern from time to time with the government’s over-indulgence to home-grown Islamic terrorists that were not taken seriously till under secretary for Asia Rocco came in Dhaka in January this year and delivered a stern message which, many speculate, led to the arrests of Bangla Bhai and his associates. The former US ambassador Harry Thomas’ frequent calls earlier for action against the Islamists in Bangladesh, though not in conformity with diplomatic practices, were dismissed by the government summarily.
The rise of corruption and poor governance also resulted in the Tuesday Club, an informal gathering of ambassadors/high commissioners of development partners, to be openly critical of the government. The foreign ministry handled the Club poorly. Instead of using tact and finesse, the foreign minister openly accused the Club of trade unionism. Unlike Bangladesh, other countries let ambassadors play a crucial role in development of bilateral relations. An ambassador’s recommendation is sought and almost always taken in every matter of bilateral importance. The foreign ministry’s failure to deal effectively with the Club together with poor governance, corruption and rising Islamic militancy contributed to marginalise Bangladesh bilaterally with most of her development partners, as feedback they received from their envoys in Dhaka were critical of the government. True, they have not gone out of the way to show that in a major way by reducing for example aid cooperation, the main platform of bilateral relations with them. Nevertheless the warmth of relations has not been there at all.
With Japan and China, too, the government’s handling of relations have been poor. China has still not forgiven Bangladesh for opening of Taiwan trade office in Dhaka without consulting with her. The foreign ministry was intriguingly superseded by the board of investment in taking the initiative. The timing of the decision was poor as it came right before the Taiwanese elections. It is true that within the One China Policy, most countries have trade and commercial relations with Taiwan. China itself does so. However, the lure of investment and trade weighed heavily in prompting Bangladesh to let Taiwan open its trade office. Important as those lures were, they cannot be reasons to annoy China which is on course to become the next superpower.
Japan is Bangladesh’s most important development partner and provides loan and grant of US$ 300 million approximately annually. The loan portion is also later turned into grant. Two years ago, Japan wrote off US1.46 billion of loans. As the next possible member of the UN security council, Japan’s importance to Bangladesh cannot be over exaggerated. Yet, the government chose to cancel a project called DAP 11 with Japan soon after coming to office, overtly because it was not economically viable but covertly, because it was signed under the AL regime. Japan was deeply offended with this unilateral cancellation. They insisted that DAP 11 must be reactivated. The Japanese argued that a change of office between the two parties cannot be an excuse for a breach of international contract. They also dismissed the economic argument. DAP 11 was eventually reactivated after 2 precious years were lost and Bangladesh’s credibility questioned by Japan. Ironically, DAP 11 is now proving economically viable. The foreign ministry, which should have known the consequences of offending Japan too well, allowed the ministry of industries to take over the conduct of bilateral relations on this crucial issue and only when the PMO heard the alarm bells, DAP 11 was reactivated. It is to Japan’s professional approach to diplomacy that once the DAP 11 was reactivated, they went about business as usual, invited Khaleda Zia to Japan on an official visit that was very successful. Japan increased its Yen loans to Bangladesh from US$ 100 to US 200 million a year from January this year. The recent visit of the Japanese foreign minister to Dhaka also bears testimony to expanding Bangladesh-Japan relations.
Loss of credibility: Sadly, where potentials were immense to take the country forward by successful management of foreign policy, under the BNP-government, Bangladesh lost her international credibility as a liberal Muslim democracy and has instead become identified as a fundamentalist Muslim state. Bangladesh also ran into trouble with all her development partners on the issues of poor governance, corruption and failure to tackle home-grown Islamists. With India, relations have never been as low as under this regime. Bangladesh also lost her leadership of the LDC group in multilateral negotiations and she witnessed Malaysia make much good use of the chairmanship of NAM that she declined to accept after being offered while the AL was in power.
True, the long list of failures in foreign policy are not all entirely failures of the foreign ministry for political leadership also contributed. Yet, the foreign ministry must share the major responsibility for it did not properly guide the political leadership in responding diplomatically to the concerns of the international community to such issues as corruption, governance and terrorism. Rather, the foreign ministry handled the issues through denial, conflict and to put it mildly, un-diplomatically. The foreign policy of this government has been reactive and that too in the negative sense.
The writer is a former Bangladesh Ambassador to Japan
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