Published in The Dhaka Courier, May 1, 2009
The Prime Minister's just concluded visit to Saudi Arabia, although taken for the purpose of performing the Umrah, achieved significant results in the shape of furthering Bangladesh's bilateral interests in the Kingdom where some 2.5 million Bangladeshis live and work. The expatriates from KSA remit the largest amount of foreign exchange to Bangladesh that amounted to US 2.7 billion in 2008 but our people there work in conditions that are pathetic and inhuman in many instances. The news that KSA has been preparing a list of 200,000 Bangladeshis who had switched jobs to be deported despite having legal papers was a burning issue that our expatriates there had been trying for the entire period of the emergency to bring to the attention of the government without either support or sympathy.
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's visit has resolved this issue as part of a Saudi law that was enacted while the PM was in Saudi Arabia. The new law will allow expatriates to switch jobs without losing their legal status to live and work in Saudi Arabia. The 200,000 Bangladeshis who were facing uncertainty and unbelievable tension will now be able to breathe again. They thus see the Prime Minister as a benefactor from the Almighty.
However, the press briefing of the Foreign Minister who accompanied the Prime Minister on this visit surprised everybody when she told journalists that Sheikh Hasina's meeting with King Abdullah was the first time in seven years that a Bangladesh Prime Minister had met the Saudi King. The BNP protested immediately with facts that showed that Khaleda Zia had met the Saudi King as Prime Minister during her tenure from 2002 to 2006 not once but four times. To embarrass the Foreign Minister even further, the State Minister for Foreign Affairs acknowledged the error made by her in a press briefing of his own.
Foreign Minister Dipu Moni is a bright and intelligent Minister and it is unbelievable that she made such a mistake. The press briefing of the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs after the BNP had come out contradicting the Foreign Minister was also a surprise move. This was a reflection on the unprofessional way things are handled at the Foreign Ministry. In the first two decades of our independence, there used to be a Director-General (External Publicity) in the Foreign Ministry who used to handle all these briefings. This office was then modeled after a similar office in the Indian External Affairs Ministry where a Minister or a State Minister in the Indian External Affairs Ministry seldom appears before the media. A Joint Secretary level bureaucrat deals with the media on a regular basis.
The Prime Minister's visit to Saudi Arabia was not a visit that was undertaken to allow her and her entourage of over 2 dozen mostly family members to perform the Umrah where at our request; the Saudis arranged a meeting with their King. The welcome news about Bangladesh expatriates was also not the result of the efforts of the Prime Minister but it was an outcome of a new Saudi law enacted by Saudi Arabia. This notwithstanding, one must share the feelings of excitement and relief among Bangladeshis in Saudi Arabia and give credit for this outcome to Sheikh Hasina. One also understands that there is political mileage here to cash upon that may have prompted the media briefing by the Foreign Minister.
The Foreign Minister, however, could have simply flagged this and left it at that. If there was an issue here to blame, that blame could have been squarely placed upon the government of Dr. Fakhruddin Ahmed that failed to take up the inhuman sufferings of Bangladeshis in Saudi Arabia. BNP for all its failures during its tenure for which it lost the elections miserably had no role to play in all this. Instead the Foreign Minister was quick to bring the BNP into the equation to suggest that one of the main reasons for the success of the visit to Saudi Arabia was because our Prime Minister was able to meet the Saudi King that Khaleda Zia failed. The State Minister while putting records straight also tried to outsmart his boss Dipu Moni. In his press briefing, Mahmud spent more time telling journalists about earlier meetings of Sheikh Hasina with the Saudi King after quickly getting over the mistake made by his boss and then going on to tell them that the Saudi King referred to our Prime Minister as "sister". It is a usual practice for the Saudi King to refer to someone like our Prime Minister as a "sister". In case of a Prime Minister who is a Muslim and male, he would call him "brother". There was nothing special in this address although the State Minister made it sound like one and also left the journalists with a feeling that this was again a "first" for Bangladesh where a Saudi King had addressed our Prime Minister as "sister".
There are two elements here that we need to focus upon. The one I have touched briefly and will again do so shortly is on the Foreign Ministry. The other is the tendency among Ministers of this Government to get on the right side of this Prime Minister by losing no opportunity of blaming the BNP and more so, Khaleda Zia, for the ills in our politics. They seem to have concluded that if they attack the former Prime Minister and the BNP, they will end up by pleasing the Prime Minister because they see her blaming the BNP and Khaldea Zia for most of the problems her government is facing now.
A significantly development in Bangladesh that has been the direct product of the rapid growth of private TV channels in the country is the exposure that it has given to the Ministers before the media. Ministers relish this exposure for it gives them publicity that they can see visually. It also gives them the opportunity to reach the Prime Minister that they normally cannot because of a variety of reasons. In other words, the Ministers use the media, particularly the visual media, to interact with the Prime Minister and say things that they think will please her. In their eagerness, most of them do not do their own homework; nor do they care to consult their other colleagues. Thus they just not end up making mistakes quite often, like the one made by the Foreign Minister, but also contradict each other. Only recently when the British born Bangladeshi Faisal was caught, a Minister went before the TV and instantly concluded that all Qaumi Madrassas are dens for Islamic terrorists. The Prime Minister thereafter met all the senior leaders of the Qaumi Madrassas and assured them to the contrary!
It is time to draw a line and get the Ministers out of media glare for their sake and for the sake of this government. No professional government conducts governance before the media; it is right of information extended beyond bounds of reason and often propriety in what these Ministers are doing on a daily basis. A Minister must come before the media when the issue is of national importance and within his/her jurisdiction. In all other cases, there should be a bureaucrat in the Ministry to do the job under the right of information. When a Minister makes a mistake before the media, there is no way of retracing without embarrassing the Government. When such a mistake in terms of information is made by a bureaucrat; it can be easily dealt with as a bureaucratic lapse.
Coming back to the Foreign Minister; her lapse is not a simple one that the State Minister for Foreign Affairs would have us think. The Saudis, if they care about Bangladesh, could of course take this differently. At its worst, they could feel drawn rather undiplomatically into the internal affairs of Bangladesh. All this could have been avoided without either of the Ministers at the Foreign Ministry facing the media. The Director-General (External Affairs) who is a senior level bureaucrat in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (this post is now filled by a career diplomat after being retrieved from the Ministry of Information) could have easily given the media the briefings, instead by the Ministers. As a bureaucrat, it would have been less likely that he would have made such factual mistake. Even if he had, the way out would not have been at all embarrassing as it has been in this instance.
Showing posts with label prime minister. Show all posts
Showing posts with label prime minister. Show all posts
Thursday, April 30, 2009
Wednesday, April 15, 2009
Moving towards a government by advisers?
Published in the Daily Star, April 16, 2009
BANGLADESH'S peaceful transition to elected government has unfortunately been overtaken by post-election conflicts, of which the BDR carnage has been the worst. As a consequence, we have failed to take advantage of an opportunity to turn the corner.
In the midst of these conflicts, we have overlooked a new trend in governance that has been set into motion by the government. Bangladesh opted for parliamentary democracy in 1991 after the country's two major political parties, Awami League and BNP, succeeded in ending the military dictatorship of General Ershad.
However, in the fifteen years during which BNP and AL held power alternately, parliamentary democracy was compromised as Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia emerged as undisputed leaders who exercised unrestrained power in the party, and in governance when in the government. At the same time, the parliament was also made non-functional as the party in opposition opted for the streets for resolution of conflicts, which made politics more conflict-ridden and violent.
The form of government in Bangladesh during this period can best be described as prime ministerial where, unlike the Westminster model, the prime minister was by no means the "first among equals;" she was much more like a president.
The incumbent government, without any discussion in parliament, has made further dents in the parliamentary or prime ministerial form of governance. This government has amended the Rules of Business to empower the prime minister to appoint any number of advisers and special assistants, and to give them status of ministers, ministers of state and deputy ministers.
The amendment thus allows the prime minister to sidestep the constitutional requirement that restricts her from appointing more than 10% of her ministers as "technocrats," who do not have to be members of Parliament. It also allows these advisers and special assistants to participate in cabinet meetings as equals to ministers, who are members of Parliament.
In the context of forms of government, this is uncharted territory for it does not fit into any known form -- parliamentary, presidential, prime ministerial, etc. The issue is not just one related to the form of government; more fundamental issues are involved here. Allowing advisers and special assistants the status of ministers/state ministers/deputy ministers, and also charge of different ministries, contradicts the sovereignty of the parliament because they are not answerable to it. Instead, they are answerable to the prime minister. In this context, the amendment has put the prime minister's power over that of the Parliament.
It would be worthwhile to look at Alexander Pope's famous dictum "for forms of government, let fools contest, whatever is administered best is best" to try and understand what is emerging in Bangladesh. Is this emerging form really going to be best for Bangladesh? This is a tough call because such a form of government has not been tried anywhere before. One can look into this issue from various viewpoints to find an answer.
First, the prime minister chose to leave out from her cabinet those who had experience as ministers during the party's last stint in power. Instead, she inducted individuals without such experience. Second, she told the new ministers that she was keeping them under watch, and if they failed to perform they would be shown the door. Third, in a talk show, one of the high profile advisers said that it was his responsibility to keep watch over the ministers and report to the prime minister.
In all these viewpoints, there is very little that suggests that this new experiment in governance will succeed. Instead, there is plenty to hint that it could cause problems rather than solve them. An interesting case in point is the ministry of energy that is headed by the prime minister. This ministry has an elected minister with the rank of a state minister, and also has an adviser with the rank of a full minister. The adviser will obviously not act under the state minister given the superior status he holds. But then, if the state minister acts at the dictates of the adviser, the principles of elected government will be compromised.
An adviser enjoying the rank of a full minister as the minister of planning and the minister of finance has been given the responsibility to look after these ministries as the prime minister's economic affairs adviser. In terms of realpolitik in Bangladesh, where access to the prime minister is a major basis of influence in governance, this system has the potential of becoming a management disaster.
The incumbent government has followed its predecessor, the un-elected caretaker government (CTG), in amending the Rules of Business (RoB). The CTG had amended the RoB to by-pass the constitutional restriction on the size of the council of advisers. The constitutional legality of that amendment was not tested in court because people were more focused on the constitutional legality of the CTG itself for extending its stay in office beyond the constitutionally set limit of ninety days.
Times are different now, and it is an elected government that is in office where the principles of democracy and constitutionality are of the essence. In the case of the AL, the principles of democracy should be more sacrosanct than it was for the un-elected (CTG).
People were disappointed when Bangabandhu imposed one-party rule in the shape of Baksal , rejecting the very principles with which he had motivated the people to follow him in 1971 to establish a democratic society and a democratic system of governance. The people have given his daughter Sheikh Hasina a historic majority and mandate, believing that her party would establish the democratic Bangladesh that had eluded her father.
Amending the RoB to allow non-elected individuals to head ministries and take part in cabinet meetings at par, or better, with elected individuals contradicts both democratic the premises and the constitution. If contested in a court of law, there is no reason why the amendment of the RoB would not be declared un-constitutional.
For a government that has been installed with broad public approval, a better way out is to elect these advisers to Parliament. The AL can do this easily, given the numbers they have in Parliament. A few members could vacate their seats to get these advisers elected. It will allow the prime minister to use their services democratically and constitutionally.
BANGLADESH'S peaceful transition to elected government has unfortunately been overtaken by post-election conflicts, of which the BDR carnage has been the worst. As a consequence, we have failed to take advantage of an opportunity to turn the corner.
In the midst of these conflicts, we have overlooked a new trend in governance that has been set into motion by the government. Bangladesh opted for parliamentary democracy in 1991 after the country's two major political parties, Awami League and BNP, succeeded in ending the military dictatorship of General Ershad.
However, in the fifteen years during which BNP and AL held power alternately, parliamentary democracy was compromised as Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia emerged as undisputed leaders who exercised unrestrained power in the party, and in governance when in the government. At the same time, the parliament was also made non-functional as the party in opposition opted for the streets for resolution of conflicts, which made politics more conflict-ridden and violent.
The form of government in Bangladesh during this period can best be described as prime ministerial where, unlike the Westminster model, the prime minister was by no means the "first among equals;" she was much more like a president.
The incumbent government, without any discussion in parliament, has made further dents in the parliamentary or prime ministerial form of governance. This government has amended the Rules of Business to empower the prime minister to appoint any number of advisers and special assistants, and to give them status of ministers, ministers of state and deputy ministers.
The amendment thus allows the prime minister to sidestep the constitutional requirement that restricts her from appointing more than 10% of her ministers as "technocrats," who do not have to be members of Parliament. It also allows these advisers and special assistants to participate in cabinet meetings as equals to ministers, who are members of Parliament.
In the context of forms of government, this is uncharted territory for it does not fit into any known form -- parliamentary, presidential, prime ministerial, etc. The issue is not just one related to the form of government; more fundamental issues are involved here. Allowing advisers and special assistants the status of ministers/state ministers/deputy ministers, and also charge of different ministries, contradicts the sovereignty of the parliament because they are not answerable to it. Instead, they are answerable to the prime minister. In this context, the amendment has put the prime minister's power over that of the Parliament.
It would be worthwhile to look at Alexander Pope's famous dictum "for forms of government, let fools contest, whatever is administered best is best" to try and understand what is emerging in Bangladesh. Is this emerging form really going to be best for Bangladesh? This is a tough call because such a form of government has not been tried anywhere before. One can look into this issue from various viewpoints to find an answer.
First, the prime minister chose to leave out from her cabinet those who had experience as ministers during the party's last stint in power. Instead, she inducted individuals without such experience. Second, she told the new ministers that she was keeping them under watch, and if they failed to perform they would be shown the door. Third, in a talk show, one of the high profile advisers said that it was his responsibility to keep watch over the ministers and report to the prime minister.
In all these viewpoints, there is very little that suggests that this new experiment in governance will succeed. Instead, there is plenty to hint that it could cause problems rather than solve them. An interesting case in point is the ministry of energy that is headed by the prime minister. This ministry has an elected minister with the rank of a state minister, and also has an adviser with the rank of a full minister. The adviser will obviously not act under the state minister given the superior status he holds. But then, if the state minister acts at the dictates of the adviser, the principles of elected government will be compromised.
An adviser enjoying the rank of a full minister as the minister of planning and the minister of finance has been given the responsibility to look after these ministries as the prime minister's economic affairs adviser. In terms of realpolitik in Bangladesh, where access to the prime minister is a major basis of influence in governance, this system has the potential of becoming a management disaster.
The incumbent government has followed its predecessor, the un-elected caretaker government (CTG), in amending the Rules of Business (RoB). The CTG had amended the RoB to by-pass the constitutional restriction on the size of the council of advisers. The constitutional legality of that amendment was not tested in court because people were more focused on the constitutional legality of the CTG itself for extending its stay in office beyond the constitutionally set limit of ninety days.
Times are different now, and it is an elected government that is in office where the principles of democracy and constitutionality are of the essence. In the case of the AL, the principles of democracy should be more sacrosanct than it was for the un-elected (CTG).
People were disappointed when Bangabandhu imposed one-party rule in the shape of Baksal , rejecting the very principles with which he had motivated the people to follow him in 1971 to establish a democratic society and a democratic system of governance. The people have given his daughter Sheikh Hasina a historic majority and mandate, believing that her party would establish the democratic Bangladesh that had eluded her father.
Amending the RoB to allow non-elected individuals to head ministries and take part in cabinet meetings at par, or better, with elected individuals contradicts both democratic the premises and the constitution. If contested in a court of law, there is no reason why the amendment of the RoB would not be declared un-constitutional.
For a government that has been installed with broad public approval, a better way out is to elect these advisers to Parliament. The AL can do this easily, given the numbers they have in Parliament. A few members could vacate their seats to get these advisers elected. It will allow the prime minister to use their services democratically and constitutionally.
Saturday, May 31, 2008
The Prime Minister's Office: A Critical reform Area
Published in The Daily Star, May 31, 2008
THESE days we are talking of reforms in governance and institutions of governance and very rightly so. We hear of reform of the Public Service Commission, the Election Commission, Police administration, etc. Yet one office at the nerve centre of governance that attained a great deal of notoriety under elected governments and added significantly to the deterioration of governance, the Prime Minister's Office, or the PMO, has so far escaped attention. To bring the point home, this is what happened to the top PMO officials under Khaleda Zia's premiership. She sent her own secretary to jail. At present her principal secretary is accused for corruption; another secretary is in jail for corruption; one of her political advisers is also in jail while another has been convicted and at present a fugitive from justice.
A friend, former officer of the Pakistan Foreign Service cadre, was cleared for promotion to the rank of a Grade B Ambassador/Additional Secretary in 2003 by the SSB chaired by the cabinet secretary. Just after the conclusion of the meeting, a phone call came from a PMO official asking the cabinet secretary not to proceed with the promotions. The case was stuck for the next 3 months. When it was cleared, my friend had retired! Scores of such promotion cases duly cleared by SSB and sent routinely to the PMO for signature were by-passed by low functionaries at the PMO for political reasons. Under the last BNP Government, a political adviser with his staff ran a parallel office at the PMO as an extension of the party office or the 'Hawa Bhavan' often rendering the principal secretary and PMO officers innocuous and silent spectators. We have read in newspaper reports about the principal secretary and a private secretary to a political adviser “fighting” over the latter's alleged corruption but unable to take action against this gentleman for his political linkage. The charge against this official was that he had acquired property illegally at Gulshan worth crores of taka.
The PMO was established in 1991 when Bangladesh adopted the parliamentary system. It replaced the President's Office where two Presidents with military background had created a very powerful secretariat. It was expected that with change of system, the PMO would lose a lot of power with Ministers sharing executive authority with the Prime Minister. That did not happen because the Prime Minister assumed almost all the powers of the President, helped by the failure of the Parliament to evolve as a meaningful branch of Government. Also, unlike other parliamentary governments, Article 55 (2) of Bangladesh Constitution stated that “the executive power of the Republic shall, in accordance with this Constitution, be exercised by or on the authority of the Prime Minister “that in effect made the system Prime Ministerial instead of a truly parliamentary one where the Prime Minister is ”the first among equals”.
The Prime Minister's dominance was reflected in an un-healthy manner in the way the PMO became a government within the government, to the exclusion of the rest of the government. The Rules of Business and Allocations of Business were suitably amended to legalize the dominance that ran contrary to the parliamentary system and kept the ministers from playing their role in governance. Ministers were vying for attention of not the Prime Minister but bureaucrats at the PMO and were busy building their “power base” by closeness with those bureaucrats who found key posts at the PMO for political reasons as the elected governments politicized it.
In a parliamentary system, political parties play a crucial role in getting a government elected. However, once it is chosen, they are not expected to have any role in governance for once in government; the party in power has to appeal to the nation that has to include everybody, including the supporters of those it has defeated in the elections. In Bangladesh, this did not happen and the parties even when in power seldom overcame narrow party interests to appeal to the broader national constituency. Thus bipartisanship and consensus around national issues never evolved in our politics. At the PMO this play of narrow party interests over broader national interests was played out in the worst ways imaginable. Party officials were brought into governance as political advisers and given offices at the PMO to perform functions “relating to Political Affairs” as entrusted by the Allocations of Business. Career bureaucrats were brought to the PMO on political considerations rather than on merit. Between the political advisers and the bureaucrats, it was just not the PMO that was politicized; together they spread the virus to the entire administration. In the last BNP era, the political advisers with the politicized bureaucrats helped the party take over the PMO and through the PMO, the entire government. Ministers were spending more time to get attention of one political adviser in particular and the “political” bureaucrats there who worked as the party's men at the PMO. The Prime Minister's son at the party office or the Hawa Bhavan encouraged the nexus and the PMO became the front for the party. This nexus became the real power at the PMO leading the ministers to seek the attention of this political adviser more than her secretariat staff including the principal secretary because the blessings of Hawa Bhavan decided most crucial issues of governance. During the last BNP government, a private secretary was the PM's nephew that helped him gain influence way out of proportion to what he deserved and helped in the PMO to evolve as an obstacle to good governance.
During the AL Government, when the PMO had not fallen to such low depths, a senior retired CSP officer who was entrusted to review the administration had called for dismantling it. In a BBC talk show a few years ago, the editor of TDS had said something extremely valuable. While acknowledging that Bangladesh had made good strides towards democracy he felt that for further evolution down the road of democracy Bangladesh would have to find ways to make the Prime Minister accountable in between the elections. That would need a lot of things falling into place, like making the parliament truly functional. If we are seeking to restrain our Prime Ministers from assuming dictatorial powers, as they have done, we could also look into whether we can amend Article 55 (2) of the Constitution and re-invest executive powers in the cabinet. Those issues notwithstanding, the reform of the PMO has become essential and critical for achieving good governance of future elected governments.
The reform of the PMO must start by addressing a major issue, drawing a line between the party and the government. The Prime Minister's role as party leader and his/her need to lead it is undoubtedly very important. But that function must be performed at the party office and not at the PMO. ROB should then be amended and the PMO should be relieved from its role in dealing with political affairs. That would not allow the political advisers to sit at the PMO and free it from party interference. The provisions under schedule V of the Allocations of Business that sets aside cases that ministries must refer to the Prime Minister should also be trimmed so as not to burden the PMO with cases that are routine. As an example, cases of promotion of Deputy Secretary should not be referred by the Establishment Division to the PMO. In trimming schedule V, the spirit should be to free the Prime Minister to concentrate on more serious affairs of the state at the policy level and correspondingly allow the Ministers to play their proper role in governance. The personnel at the PMO must be chosen strictly on merit and the chain of command there under the principal secretary should not be broken by outside interference. On the conflict of interest issue, no close relative of future PMs should be appointed to any post at the PMO.
The most important objective of reform of the PMO must be to free it from political interference and bring professionalism to it. Towards the end of the BNP Government, public confidence in government was all but shattered because of the unholy nexus between the PMO and the Hawa Bhavan. That nexus should not be allowed in the next elected government. The reforms would create that environment but whether the nexus would not be repeated would depend to a large extent upon the next Prime Minister who we hope would come reformed as a consequence of developments in our politics since 1/11. While the PM's choice would be made by the election, the principal secretary would be selected. That selection should be made with great care keeping in mind that he would be the individual on whose personality and leadership qualities a reformed and professional PMO would like to make a new beginning where it would be the cause of removal of people's sufferings instead of being the cause of it.
Bangladesh's potentials are immense; we are the envy of our neighbours because of our history and our homogeneity. Yet we are languishing, hovering between hopes and despair because we have failed to establish bipartisanship in our politics. The PMO is not a party office, and by re-establishing that through the reforms suggested, Bangladesh could make a long awaited start towards bipartisan politics whose impact on the country could be the beginning of the realization of the dreams for which we had established Bangladesh through immense sacrifices.
THESE days we are talking of reforms in governance and institutions of governance and very rightly so. We hear of reform of the Public Service Commission, the Election Commission, Police administration, etc. Yet one office at the nerve centre of governance that attained a great deal of notoriety under elected governments and added significantly to the deterioration of governance, the Prime Minister's Office, or the PMO, has so far escaped attention. To bring the point home, this is what happened to the top PMO officials under Khaleda Zia's premiership. She sent her own secretary to jail. At present her principal secretary is accused for corruption; another secretary is in jail for corruption; one of her political advisers is also in jail while another has been convicted and at present a fugitive from justice.
A friend, former officer of the Pakistan Foreign Service cadre, was cleared for promotion to the rank of a Grade B Ambassador/Additional Secretary in 2003 by the SSB chaired by the cabinet secretary. Just after the conclusion of the meeting, a phone call came from a PMO official asking the cabinet secretary not to proceed with the promotions. The case was stuck for the next 3 months. When it was cleared, my friend had retired! Scores of such promotion cases duly cleared by SSB and sent routinely to the PMO for signature were by-passed by low functionaries at the PMO for political reasons. Under the last BNP Government, a political adviser with his staff ran a parallel office at the PMO as an extension of the party office or the 'Hawa Bhavan' often rendering the principal secretary and PMO officers innocuous and silent spectators. We have read in newspaper reports about the principal secretary and a private secretary to a political adviser “fighting” over the latter's alleged corruption but unable to take action against this gentleman for his political linkage. The charge against this official was that he had acquired property illegally at Gulshan worth crores of taka.
The PMO was established in 1991 when Bangladesh adopted the parliamentary system. It replaced the President's Office where two Presidents with military background had created a very powerful secretariat. It was expected that with change of system, the PMO would lose a lot of power with Ministers sharing executive authority with the Prime Minister. That did not happen because the Prime Minister assumed almost all the powers of the President, helped by the failure of the Parliament to evolve as a meaningful branch of Government. Also, unlike other parliamentary governments, Article 55 (2) of Bangladesh Constitution stated that “the executive power of the Republic shall, in accordance with this Constitution, be exercised by or on the authority of the Prime Minister “that in effect made the system Prime Ministerial instead of a truly parliamentary one where the Prime Minister is ”the first among equals”.
The Prime Minister's dominance was reflected in an un-healthy manner in the way the PMO became a government within the government, to the exclusion of the rest of the government. The Rules of Business and Allocations of Business were suitably amended to legalize the dominance that ran contrary to the parliamentary system and kept the ministers from playing their role in governance. Ministers were vying for attention of not the Prime Minister but bureaucrats at the PMO and were busy building their “power base” by closeness with those bureaucrats who found key posts at the PMO for political reasons as the elected governments politicized it.
In a parliamentary system, political parties play a crucial role in getting a government elected. However, once it is chosen, they are not expected to have any role in governance for once in government; the party in power has to appeal to the nation that has to include everybody, including the supporters of those it has defeated in the elections. In Bangladesh, this did not happen and the parties even when in power seldom overcame narrow party interests to appeal to the broader national constituency. Thus bipartisanship and consensus around national issues never evolved in our politics. At the PMO this play of narrow party interests over broader national interests was played out in the worst ways imaginable. Party officials were brought into governance as political advisers and given offices at the PMO to perform functions “relating to Political Affairs” as entrusted by the Allocations of Business. Career bureaucrats were brought to the PMO on political considerations rather than on merit. Between the political advisers and the bureaucrats, it was just not the PMO that was politicized; together they spread the virus to the entire administration. In the last BNP era, the political advisers with the politicized bureaucrats helped the party take over the PMO and through the PMO, the entire government. Ministers were spending more time to get attention of one political adviser in particular and the “political” bureaucrats there who worked as the party's men at the PMO. The Prime Minister's son at the party office or the Hawa Bhavan encouraged the nexus and the PMO became the front for the party. This nexus became the real power at the PMO leading the ministers to seek the attention of this political adviser more than her secretariat staff including the principal secretary because the blessings of Hawa Bhavan decided most crucial issues of governance. During the last BNP government, a private secretary was the PM's nephew that helped him gain influence way out of proportion to what he deserved and helped in the PMO to evolve as an obstacle to good governance.
During the AL Government, when the PMO had not fallen to such low depths, a senior retired CSP officer who was entrusted to review the administration had called for dismantling it. In a BBC talk show a few years ago, the editor of TDS had said something extremely valuable. While acknowledging that Bangladesh had made good strides towards democracy he felt that for further evolution down the road of democracy Bangladesh would have to find ways to make the Prime Minister accountable in between the elections. That would need a lot of things falling into place, like making the parliament truly functional. If we are seeking to restrain our Prime Ministers from assuming dictatorial powers, as they have done, we could also look into whether we can amend Article 55 (2) of the Constitution and re-invest executive powers in the cabinet. Those issues notwithstanding, the reform of the PMO has become essential and critical for achieving good governance of future elected governments.
The reform of the PMO must start by addressing a major issue, drawing a line between the party and the government. The Prime Minister's role as party leader and his/her need to lead it is undoubtedly very important. But that function must be performed at the party office and not at the PMO. ROB should then be amended and the PMO should be relieved from its role in dealing with political affairs. That would not allow the political advisers to sit at the PMO and free it from party interference. The provisions under schedule V of the Allocations of Business that sets aside cases that ministries must refer to the Prime Minister should also be trimmed so as not to burden the PMO with cases that are routine. As an example, cases of promotion of Deputy Secretary should not be referred by the Establishment Division to the PMO. In trimming schedule V, the spirit should be to free the Prime Minister to concentrate on more serious affairs of the state at the policy level and correspondingly allow the Ministers to play their proper role in governance. The personnel at the PMO must be chosen strictly on merit and the chain of command there under the principal secretary should not be broken by outside interference. On the conflict of interest issue, no close relative of future PMs should be appointed to any post at the PMO.
The most important objective of reform of the PMO must be to free it from political interference and bring professionalism to it. Towards the end of the BNP Government, public confidence in government was all but shattered because of the unholy nexus between the PMO and the Hawa Bhavan. That nexus should not be allowed in the next elected government. The reforms would create that environment but whether the nexus would not be repeated would depend to a large extent upon the next Prime Minister who we hope would come reformed as a consequence of developments in our politics since 1/11. While the PM's choice would be made by the election, the principal secretary would be selected. That selection should be made with great care keeping in mind that he would be the individual on whose personality and leadership qualities a reformed and professional PMO would like to make a new beginning where it would be the cause of removal of people's sufferings instead of being the cause of it.
Bangladesh's potentials are immense; we are the envy of our neighbours because of our history and our homogeneity. Yet we are languishing, hovering between hopes and despair because we have failed to establish bipartisanship in our politics. The PMO is not a party office, and by re-establishing that through the reforms suggested, Bangladesh could make a long awaited start towards bipartisan politics whose impact on the country could be the beginning of the realization of the dreams for which we had established Bangladesh through immense sacrifices.
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