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The cross border ground attack is part of a three phase American plan to try and capture top Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders including Osama Bin laden and Ayman al Zawrahri. It was carried under an order that Bush signed secretly in July and became public knowledge only after the September 3rd attack. Attacks from helicopters and Predator unmanned drones with knowledge of Pakistani military intelligence was being carried out for some time and seven such attacks were carried out since August 13th causing significant number of civilian casualties and discontent in Pakistan. Earlier on August 27th, General Kayani had a meeting abroad USS Abraham Lincoln with senior US military leaders where he underlined public support for military operations for winning the war on terrorism. Later, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen acknowledged Kayani's argument although it is now clear that Kayani was not informed about Bush's secret order.
The resurgence of the Al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Pakistan's fragile north-west had been worrying the US for some time. This year 113 US soldiers have already been killed in Afghanistan against a record 111 last year and 519 deaths since the war against terrorism started seven years ago. The White House had been under increased pressure from the intelligence and military to use ground force to attack Al Qaeda and Taliban in their sanctuaries without informing Pakistan's military intelligence, which the State Department opposed for keeping together the coalition that was weakening for a number of reasons. Bush finally agreed with his military and intelligence when he was given enough evidence that Al Qaeda and Talibans were being tipped off by Pakistan's ISI about operations against them well in advance.
General Kayani has been backed by Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani fully on his tough stand. Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, whose party is the largest opposition, has called for Pakistan to pull out of the coalition. In a country, where despite the alliance at the top with the USA, anti-American sentiments are widespread, the cross border ground attack has not created the passion in the streets that was expected. The media, however, has criticized Government's reaction as lip service, hinting instead at a secret deal between Washington and Islamabad on the cross border ground attack. One reason for the subdued public outcry is that the main Islamic Party of Maulana Fazal-ur-Rahman has joined the coalition with Zardari's People's Party and thus has been restrained in arousing public sentiments. The Ramadan is another reason for the subdued public reaction. One issue is clear though that Kayani made his statement without consulting the President that could hint at bumpy relation between the two in future; that is not a good omen for Pakistan's attempts to return to democratic rule.
Apart from the issue of the cross border attack, Pakistan has not been happy for some time, even when Mushraff was in office. That her contribution has not been acknowledged in Washington properly, having so far sacrificed more than a thousand army and police personnel in fighting the war on terror against public opposition is the main reason. The unilateral ground attack has thus added salt to the injury.
The September 3rd attack under Bush's secret order underscores USA's deep mistrust of the ISI. But then Pakistan's ability to pull out of the coalition is easier said than done. Pakistan Government has high stakes in keeping the US happy because of the billions of dollars she receives in aid. Before 9/11, Pakistan was a pariah state to the USA because Mushraff had usurped power through a military coup. Yet, after 9/11, it was Mushraff who received one of the first calls from Bush and Pakistan became USA's closest ally in the war against terror. It allowed its territory to be used for bringing down the Taliban in Afghanistan that was shielding Osama Bin laden and Ayman Zawrahri. A President who could not even hope for a courtesy call at the White House officially before 9/11 was invited to share time with the US President at his Crawford Ranch, a place reserved for just a few of the world's leaders as Bush and Mushraff became buddies and USA and Pakistan partners in the war against terror. Mushraff, to his credit, used US aid and friendship for Pakistan's economic development extremely well.
Nevertheless despite Mushraff, Pakistan's public opinion remained sympathetic towards the Islamic fundamentalist, proven by the many assassination attempts on him, some involving people assigned to give him security. The irony is that it was the US encouragement that created not just wide public support in Pakistan for the Islamic fundamentalists; it was the US that brought Pakistan's ISI to close interaction with the Talibans to end the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Over a decade the ISI, the Talibans and US intelligence worked hand in glove against the Soviets. When Soviet Union broke, the US withdrew abruptly from Afghanistan without acknowledging that their encouragement had created the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The US's sudden withdrawal understandably did not destroy the nexus between the ISI, the Talibans and Al Qaeda that was merely suppressed when Mushraff took Pakistan to join the US coalition. With the weakening of top leadership in Pakistan, the nexus is surfacing.
Pakistan is facing a 'catch 22' situation; damned if they stay with the coalition, damned if they do not. In fact Pakistan is in no position to decide the issue, Kayani's resolve to protect Pakistan's territorial integrity at any cost notwithstanding. The two sides must sit and resolve US's claims that its troops stationed in Afghanistan can cross into Pakistan anytime without permission under the rules of engagement that Pakistan hotly contests. Till then, the US action under Bush's secret order is bound to make Pakistan's volatile politics even more volatile and uncertain. The embarrassment it has caused will favour the extremists. The worst predicament faces Zardari because he is the one who would, as President, have to face the developments from the cross border attacks as the focal point. If such attacks increase, the US would expect him to back the attacks, something that he can do only by becoming unpopular with his people. Already, many questions have been raised about him for the way he found the route to Pakistan's presidency. If he fails to satisfy public opinion by backing the US on the issue, he would be seen as a US lackey, something he can ill afford if he intends to remain President a long time. Those who had cheered in the streets when Mushraff resigned may have to think again for despite his bragging, Mushraff had demonstrated the ability to lead Pakistan. Pakistan is facing a very uncertain future and her tryst with military dictatorship may return again. US could expedite that by more cross border attacks that would only make Pakistan's politics more fragile and make it difficult for her to support US in a manner that would ensure victory in the war against terror. September 3rd cross border attack is thus a watershed in US-Pakistan relations.
At the point of writing, Pakistan's new leaders seem to have opted for diplomacy, dropping sharply on the rhetoric, although not abandoning it altogether. Defense Minister Ahmed Mukhtar has claimed that the Government has received assurances from State Department and Pentagon that September 3rd action will not be repeated; the two sides will exchange information and Pakistan military and paramilitary will take action against the terrorists. This is a statement to placate Pakistan's domestic needs. Possibility of Pakistan-USA relations deteriorating over Bush's secret order may not end so easily; not till a new President enters the White House for Bush may yet be hoping, now desperately, to net Osama and Al Zawrahri before he moves out! Meanwhile all Pakistan's leaders can do is hope that US would relent on cross border and missile attacks and public reaction would remain subdued.
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