Whither Egypt’s Unfinished revolution?
Published in The Daily Sun
August 12th., 2012
The Egyptian revolution,
that had attracted attention worldwide when all eyes were focused on Tahrir
Square for the dawning of democracy not just in Egypt but in the region, is
stuck between the hard rock and the sea or so it appears. An elected President, Mohammed Masri, is in
office. He has also appointed a Prime Minister and a Cabinet. However, a parliament
elected democratically in January this year has been dissolved by the military
and the judges backed it on technicality.
Today, the military
operating collectively as the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) holds most
of the state powers to suggest that Egypt is yet quite a distance from winning
its democratic credentials. Many outside Egypt who watched the revolution
unfurl in Tahrir Square that brought down President’s Mubarak’s 3 decades long
hold on power in less than 3 weeks time are puzzled by the present political
situation in Egypt.
Egypt democratic
transition has now become a cat and mouse game between the SCAF and the deeply divided
civilian parties/groups where the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has emerged in the dominant
position. The revolution at Tahrir Square as a part of the Arab Spring was a
movement of the youth who had passion but not vision; nor organization. The
movement achieved its “critical mass” only after the MB lent support to it.
Nevertheless it was only after the military backed away from President Mubarak
that one of the most powerful and longest serving dictators in modern history
was compelled to hand power in such quick time.
The cat and mouse game
the MB is now playing with the SCAF is a strategic one in which it is showing
the maturity and experience it has achieved in its 84 years of existence.
During most of this period till it formed the Freedom and Justice Party after
the ouster of President Mubarak, it was a banned organization because of its
fundamentalism and acts of terrorism that included an attempt to kill President
Nasser. Nevertheless, in those many decades, the MB never lost the confidence
that someday it would dominate Egypt’s politics. It built a strong base and
network among the people, becoming deeply involved in the social and
humanitarian works and services.
In dealing with the SCAF,
the MB is working within the parameters of the new realities in Egyptian
politics today. First, it is conscious of Egypt’s multi-cultural foundations;
that although it is the largest and dominant political party, yet there is a
substantial part of the Egyptian society that is secular and liberal who
together with the 10% Christians in the country, have still serious
reservations about the MB. Second, the
military in Egypt has tentacles deep in society, security and politics that
have not been touched by the Egyptian revolution, not yet. Third, the secular and Christian forces look
upon the military as a balance to the MB and its fundamentalist politics.
Finally, Egyptians are proud of their military for the wars it fought against
Israel. It was the dreaded security forces created under President Mubarak’s
direct control and supervision, and not the military that Egyptians feared and hated.
The MB is confident that
its time will come eventually to win the political powers usurped by the
military and is in no hurry to confront the SCAF. MB Parliamentarian Osama
Suleiman put across the view succinctly when he said: “The army is owned by the
people. Civilian oversight of the military is popular will and nobody can stop
popular will.” In deciding to go slow, the MB is conscious of
the Algerian experience. It does not want to give the military the excuse to
crack down violently and derail the revolution.
It thus has so far
placated the SCAF by showing patience when the latter was taking its own time
to hold the parliamentary elections last year and the pro-revolution forces were
getting impatient. Instead, it used the time to join the nationalist Wafd party
to form the Democratic Alliance with 40 other political parties. The alliance
broke when the MB insisted on 40% seats for the parliamentary elections but by
the time it broke, the MB had established itself as the leading political party.
As a consequence, it went on to win 47% of the seats in the elections to the
lower house of the Egyptian parliament. In early June, the SCAF dissolved the
lower house and the courts upheld the action on technicality. Yet the MB
remained silent.
When the SCAF announced a
constitutional declaration days before the Presidential election that was
viewed by everyone as a subtle military coup and even a counter-revolution, the
MB did not protest. By the declaration,
the SCAF turned the Presidency powerless and took over the powers of writing
the constitution. The MB, confident of winning the presidency, did not want to
give the military an excuse to delay or postpone the election and hence
remained quiet over the “military coup.”.
It just wanted to win the presidency and the parliament through
democratic elections and wait for appropriate time to wrest powers for both the
institutions from the SCAF.
Its strategy worked.
After holding the country in suspense, the SCAF accepted the election of the MB
candidate Mohammed Morsi as the elected President of a post-revolution Egypt by
a thin margin of 51.7% against 47.3% votes won by General Ahmed Shafik that the
SCAF and liberal/Christian forces in the country backed. The MB at first
announced that the new President would take oath in Parliament to show contempt
for the SCAF’s decision to dissolve the lower house or the People’s Council.
Later it appeased the SCAF and the judges by taking oath before the Supreme Constitutional
Court. The MB then focused on choosing the Cabinet to placate the political
forces. It agreed at first to take 30% of the cabinet posts but later enhanced it
40%. The MB also agreed to nominate a Vice President each from among the women
and Christians respectively. It appointed as Prime Minister who is not a member
of the MB.
In each of the steps the
MB has taken so far ; its strategy has been to push from the top its 82 years
of hard work in the Egyptian society to connect the power structure to its base.
It achieving this connectivity, the MB’s objective is to widen its acceptance
among the civilian forces that are apprehensive of its fundamentalist base. Towards
that, the MB is also shedding a lot of its fundamentalist edges. For instance,
the MB has compromised on the public sale of alcohol which is unimaginable in
an Islamic state in view its importance to the critical tourist industry.
Nevertheless, in reaching out among the political groups, the MB is also keenly
aware of keeping its dominance. Even where it has placed a Ministry under a
non-MB Minister, it has appointed a junior MB Minister to keep control.
The next round in the cat
and mouse game between the MB and the SCAF would be played when the
constitution is written. The Generals
have made it clear about their intention to engrave into the constitution, a
role for the military to their liking. The MB while trying to get greater
acceptance among the people would be fighting the SPCA on the constitution and
powers for the presidency and parliament till “civilian oversight of the
military” is established. The game is going to be a long and protracted one but
most Egyptians are happy that the MB and the SCAF have avoided confrontation
mainly because of the matured handling of politics by the MB.
Nothing dramatic is thus
expected to happen in Egypt’s politics in the immediate future. Nevertheless, the military forces will find it
increasingly difficult to have their ways without questions asked and without
accountability as the MB spreads its influence over the main political
institutions. In the MB, Egypt’s
military has met more than its match that is reaching out to the people
democratically to build its credibility and legitimacy. With such a cool and
calculated approach , the military is bound to be shed most of the powers that
it has assumed un-democratically. When it does is a matter of time.
At the time of filing
this piece, President Morsi has exercised his presidential powers by dismissing
intelligence chief General Muwafi and Governor of North Sinai province together
with major intelligence shakeup over clashes between the military and
extremists in Sinai that left 16 Egyptian soldiers dead. General Muwafi appeared to be emerging into the footsteps of
General Omar Suleiman, the charismatic former intelligence chief of President
Mubarak, and had the confidence of the US and Israel. The President and the
SCAF came together in dismissing General Muwafi as a fall guy for the deaths of
the soldiers in Sinai that angered Egyptians.
The writer is a former Ambassador to Japan and
Egypt
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