Transit and Geopolitical Realities

Published in The Daily Star August 16, 2008

BANGLADESH has once again deflected the Indian request for transit at the just concluded Foreign Secretary level talks. The transit to the seven Northeast Indian provinces (Assam, Nagaland, Tripura, Meghalaya, Manipur, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh) known as the Seven Sisters (SS) from the rest of India through Bangladesh, to which request to use of the Chittagong Port for these provinces was added later, has been unresolved since the Bangladesh-India Trade Agreement of 1972 called for use of railways, waterways and road in each other's country for trade.

In isolation, the request is innocuous, an economic issue in the words of the Indian High Commissioner. In the context of Bangladesh-India relations, it is neither innocuous nor economic but a highly sensitive issue. All past Governments of Bangladesh, political parties, the civil society and the public generally have rejected the issue. In a country where bipartisanship on national issues is unknown to the two major political parties, this issue unites both the BNP and the AL in denial, as it unites every group, every opinion. The manner in which political parties, the civil society and the public reject the Indian request is also worth noting as was evident in a meeting called by the BNP alliance to protest the Indian request when news came to press that the current Government would agree to give India transit, at the New Delhi Bangladesh India Foreign Secretary level meeting. Speakers were so charged that it appeared as if India had invaded Bangladesh unilaterally.

Why does a seemingly innocuous issue arouse such nationalistic passion in Bangladesh? It is a very complex question whose answer is embedded partly in psychology and party in history. A fear that Bangladesh would lose its sovereignty to India has never left the minds of most Bangladeshis since her independence, because India is 23 times bigger, and surrounds her on three sides. This fear has been aggravated by a history of India's overbearing attitude in all unresolved bilateral issues where she has been unilateral and unfair in negotiations to resolve them. The Ganges water sharing issue arising out of India's unilateral construction and implementation of the Farakka Barrage just before the mighty Ganges enters Bangladesh has been the litmus test in enhancing Bangladesh's fear and distrust of India. Bangladeshis believe they were taken for granted on the Farakka issue and denied a fair share of the waters of this international river since it was activated in 1974 that has started the process of desertification of northern part of Bangladesh. Almost all of Bangladesh's other 50 plus rivers, including the Brahmaputra, also flow from India. As an agricultural country where her rivers sustain life and livelihood in a major way, this fact sends shivers down most Bangladeshis spine in the fear that India would ultimately deprive them of the waters of these rivers as well. In 1974, the two countries signed the Indira-Mujib Border Agreement that Bangladesh ratified within months and fulfilled its obligations. Till today India has not fulfilled its treaty obligations. In 1992, Bangladesh lowered tariffs against a large number of Indian commodities soon after signing the SAPTA. India has not done so yet, as a result of which the bilateral trade imbalance that was already heavily in India's favour has widened further. India has built fence all along its border with Bangladesh to stop what it terms as illegal migration, which Bangladesh denies. A segment of the Indian media and academia have been instrumental in projecting Bangladesh as a fundamentalist Muslim state although she is a liberal democracy.

The India psychosis is also based on India's poor relations with her other South Asian neighbours where only Pakistan has been taken seriously as it is a fellow nuclear power. India has not taken positive steps to allay their fears appearing instead the same way the neo-cons under Bush appear to the rest of the world; a take it or leave it attitude that has vitiated good neighborliness in South Asia. Given its size and importance, India's neighbours expect her to allay their insecurity by making concession to their needs. Instead, India has demanded more of its neighbours than the concessions she has made or willing to make.

The psychology and history explaining the passion of ultra-nationalism that India arouses in Bangladesh notwithstanding, it is time we take a reality check on the transit issue. A few facts beg consideration for our national interest. The first is geopolitics; that Bangladesh just not stands in between the SS and the rest of India; she is also between these provinces and their access to the sea, thus holding the key to their economic development to the fullest potential. If India gets transit, it will save her billions of dollars annually and time, both critical to the economic development of the SS. Second is India's role in world affairs. Today India is an acknowledged regional power. No great power will help Bangladesh to resolve her problems with India. Bangladesh will have to negotiate with India and resolve these issues. The importance of good relations with India can hardly be over-emphasized. For example, Bangladesh has, according to credible international energy assessments, potential for hydrocarbons in the Bay of Bengal. Unfortunately, her maritime boundary issue with India is unresolved. Bangladesh will thus have difficulty in drilling for oil or gas there.

Bangladesh must thus look at the transit issue dispassionately, bearing in mind that this is a card in her hand given by geography. Here are the advantages. The transit and the use of Chittagong Port will integrate the economies of the SS to Bangladesh giving her leverage in future negotiations with India on other issues where she now has none. Bangladesh will earn substantial amount of money from transit and use of the port because India must pay for using these not forgetting that she now spend billions of dollars and extra time annually in their absence. A positive stance will also motivate India to be fair to Bangladesh on water and other unresolved issues. It will also create trust and confidence in Bangladesh and the environment for mutually beneficial cooperation between just not Bangladesh and India but sub-regional cooperation by including Nepal and Bhutan to harness the vast water resources in the region that is potentially the second richest in the world. However, transit right need not necessarily be in perpetuity and can be always be revoked should India not reciprocate in equal measure.

Bangladesh must realize that the transit and use of Chittagong Port are the only cards she has to interest India and that a friendly India is crucial to her future. Given India's track record, it will not be easy to use these issues as negotiating chips for securing Bangladesh's interests such as a just share of waters of the common rivers, removing trade imbalance, a just and fair maritime accord, etc. That is a chance Bangladesh must take for its future. This will be a test of diplomatic skills of those in charge, whose hands Bangladesh must strengthen by a pragmatic stance on this issue in particular and on her relations with India in general.

However, decision on transit must be left to an elected government because of the significance of the issue, but resolve she must if she is realistic and has an understanding of the international forces at play in a new and evolving world order. India must consider the billions of dollars she will save from the transit and its positive impact on the SS. She must also consider the impact of this on the prospect of harnessing and using the vast water resources through sub-regional cooperation; in tackling her fear of terrorism; and the credibility it will create for her in world affairs where her poor relations with neighbours is one that those critical about her can legitimately use against her.

If Bangladesh plays the transit card right, there is no logical reason for India not to reciprocate for her own sake because the consequence of a destabilized of 150 million people is too nightmarish for her. Bangladesh and India must not waste a win win situation for both because of politics. India must show that her heart is large enough to match her size and stature. Bangladesh must show that she has a grasp of reality.

National Security Council for Bangladesh

Published in The Daily Star, March 5, 2008

A US National Security Council in session

I once sat in a high profile meeting when the country had an elected government as a Director General in the Foreign Ministry. Those who attended that meeting were the Ministers of Foreign and Home Affairs with their respective Secretary and top level representatives of civil and military intelligence. Security issues were on top of the agenda of that meeting. I was astonished to learn at that meeting that on crucial national security issues, the Foreign Minister was in total darkness and that intelligence available to the military was unknown to the civil intelligence. At the Home Ministry, what the Secretary knew was not in his Minister's knowledge. Since that strange meeting, I always felt Bangladesh needed a National Security Council for a professional and transparent way to deal with national security and intelligence issues that are vital for formulating the country's foreign and defense policies.

A National Security Council or its equivalent is now an essential part of governments of most countries. It has become indispensable for professionally integrating intelligence and security issues into well considered foreign and defense policies for maintaining sovereignty and furthering national interests in an increasingly globalized world. It has been an integral part of Government in the United States since it was set up under the Presidency of President Harry Truman. In India, it was set up in 1998 when the BJP Government was in office. National Security Council of Pakistan in its current version was created in April 2004 by an Act.

Historically, National Security Council has followed a perceptible pattern in evolution. Countries with strong democratic foundations have evolved one type of NSC while a country where the presence of the military is strong has evolved a different type. The United States and India are good examples of the first type where the military and intelligence agencies are given a place in the NSC in advisory roles. Turkey is an example of the second type where its NSC called the Milli Guvenlik Kurulu has institutionalized Turkish military's dominance and influence over politics.

A NSC for Bangladesh is not a new idea. A circular was issued by the Cabinet Division in 1996 creating a 23 member NSC headed by the Prime Minister. It was given a wide range of responsibilities ranging from ensuring national security to accountability of the Government as well as dealing with internal problems tied to security. But the concept was stillborn and fizzled till this Government came to office. Going by what one reads in the newspapers, a NSC for Bangladesh seems imminent with a few suggesting that it will be in place as early as end of May.

Not everybody is of course excited that a NSC is imminent for Bangladesh. A great deal of doubt has arisen within the public as the concept has not been debated at any length by this Government. In the absence of the parliament, there is also no forum to debate this issue in a manner that can take all concerns on board. A few seminars by think tanks have attempted to debate the issue. Unfortunately, these seminars have added more doubt in the public mind. In one well-publicized seminar held recently, a sponsor went to the extent of stating to the media that a NSC should be constituted immediately in order to allow the country to benefit from all the positive developments that this Government has achieved after 1/11. His statement left no one in doubt that he was suggesting that unless the military is given a major role through the NSC, democracy would be in peril when an elected Government comes.

Therefore, in establishing a NSC in Bangladesh, a few issues must be settled first for such a Council not to be again stillborn like the attempt in 1996. Before it is delivered, it must be absolutely clear to the public that a NSC is not a civil versus military issue and that it is not a covert way of bringing the military into politics. It must also be made absolutely clear that, the mess into which the politicians have landed the country notwithstanding, the supremacy of elected representatives over un-elected ones is an undeniable fact in dealing with issues of sovereignty, security and intelligence. At the same time, a NSC should act as a reminder to elected representatives that they cannot put national interests and sovereignty into jeopardy by internal conflicts. Given our ethos as a nation where we perhaps stand uniquely on our own for sacrifices for establishing democracy, we should therefore chose as a model the US type of NSC with modifications to suit our needs (we need not have a very complex one as the US NSC is) while be careful in not going after the Turkish model that give too much prominence to the military.

A NSC for Bangladesh should be a two-tiered body. The apex tier should be headed by the Prime Minister. This body should meet at regular intervals to consider issues/papers/documents prepared by the second tier and give policy decisions on issues of national security. In addition to considering national security and intelligence issues that have direct relation to sovereignty or threat to it arising from external sources, the NSC should also be entrusted with internal crisis management that threatens sovereignty. The apex tier should in addition to the Prime Minister, have as members the Leader of the Opposition, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, and Defense (why should the Prime Minister hold this portfolio? Is politics involved here?), the Chief of the Army (in place of a Joint Chief of Staff that we do not have in Bangladesh) and the Cabinet Secretary. Chiefs of civil and military intelligence should sit in NSC meetings as advisors. The second tier should comprise bureaucrats from the Ministry of Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, Army, Navy and Air Force, the civil and military intelligence agencies, the Police and BDR. In developing such a NSC, the task of coordination and smooth flow of intelligence and information between the military, security and civilians in the second tier should be given utmost importance. A post of a National Security Adviser (NSA) should be created directly under the Prime Minister for this purpose. The NSA should be a very senior retired diplomat or an armed forces officer who should carry the rank of a Minister. In a Government structure already too bloated for reasons of rationality, the NSA could use bureaucrats at the Prime Minister's Office where a Director General with requisite number of officials could provide the NSA administrative support. Issues of national security and intelligence are matters that, despite the need for transparency, cannot be made public knowledge.

Then again, the NSC must not use such a necessity to become an extra-constitutional body. It must be accountable to the Parliament through the Prime Minister.

The inclusion of the Leader of the Opposition should allow bipartisanship in dealing with crucial national issues, something sadly lacking in our system of governance.

The military and intelligence agencies have always been dealing with security and intelligence issues keeping those in charge constitutionally to deal with such issues in darkness in the absence of an established procedure or structure. The BNP and the AL Governments allowed the military and intelligence agencies de facto veto power in security and intelligence issues in manner that was non-transparent and did not always serve the best interest of the nation. A NSC will allow a professional and transparent way of cooperation between the civil, military and intelligence agencies and integration of national security and intelligence issues into defense and foreign policies in the best interest of the country.

The necessity of a NSC cannot be over-emphasized. At the same time, it may not be wise to hurry in through because doubts have arisen in the public mind caused, no doubt, by some over enthusiastic people. Recently, Justice Habibur Rahman, former Chief Adviser, said in a seminar that military's interference in politics cannot benefit the country; his statement created substantial vibes in the public mind. Some politicians have also spoken publicly that the armed forces are seeking a safe exit for themselves given the fact that they have upset the politicians by their drive against widespread corruption in politics and governance. The Army Chief's most recent meeting with senior editors where he has cleared these misgivings categorically is very encouraging. Still doubts linger. Therefore, the imperative of a NSC for Bangladesh notwithstanding, it may be wise for this Government to draw the concept paper of a well thought out NSC and leave it to the elected Government to deliver it as an integral part of executive branch of the Government under the wings of the Prime Minister.

Religious Terrorism in Bangladesh

Published in The Daily Star, July 26, 2008

A Bangladeshi journalist working for a foreign radio station warned me recently against being complacent about Islamic fundamentalists in Bangladesh. I argued that despite its overwhelming Muslim population, Bangladesh has historically rejected political parties that have used Islam in elections. Jamaat-e-Islami, the best known among such parties, has never won even a handful of seats in elections, achieving the best of 14 seats in the 2001 elections as a result of its alliance with the BNP. I also argued that despite being predominantly Muslim, Bangladesh is the most liberal South Asian country where Islam has been influenced by Sufism with the least incidence of communal violence that are so endemic in other parts of this sub-continent.

Its liberal traditions notwithstanding, the two mainstream political parties earned for Bangladesh the label of a country that supports Islamic terrorism during the last BNP term. The BNP played the major part by allowing Jamaat-e-Islami indulgence to put a terrorist infrastructure in place as a payback for its votes that helped it win a 2/3 majority in the 2001 elections. The Jamaatul Muhahadeen Bangladesh (JMB) terrorists, who earned the maximum notoriety, was nurtured by BNP top leadership to help its leaders in northern Bangladesh win territorial control over the extreme leftist elements there and also to please Jamaat-e-Islami. The Awami League did its part by publicising abroad this evil nexus, labeling Bangladesh as Taliban that countries and interested groups abroad used to identify Bangladesh as a supporter of Islamic terrorism. The Indian media also played a role in projecting Bangladesh in a bad light, identifying it as a “locus of Islamic terrorism”.

The former US Ambassador Harry Thomas had spared no efforts to warn the Government about the growing Frankenstein. India watched developments with understandable concern and conveyed these to Secretary of State Condalizza Rice on her visit to New Delhi in March 2005. Rice told the press during the visit that Bangladesh could become the next Afghanistan and that India and USA would look after Bangladesh. The BNP Government remained unmoved and termed the concern over the Islamic fundamentalist forces as “media hype”. Encouraged, these forces carried out nearly 500 simultaneous bomb blasts all over the country in August, 2005 that proved that these terrorists had a terrorist infrastructure in place and had also infiltrated the country's intelligence although the blasts caused little damage and just two deaths. Khaleda Zia cut short an official visit to China and returned home but did little to contain these forces except issue arrest warrants against leading JMB terrorists that were not pursued seriously.

The BNP finally acted only after the US Assistant Secretary Christina Rocco visited Dhaka in January 2006 and delivered a harsh ultimatum to the Government to rein in the JMB terrorists. Within weeks, Sheikh Abdur Rahman and Bangla Bhai with 4 others were incarcerated in a make believe manner that left little doubt that they had escaped being arrested earlier due to state sponsorship. In jail, these JMB terrorists were treated as VIPs, leading to speculation that they would be released at an appropriate time. The politics of the country then slipped into anarchy, leading to 1/11 when fate intervened. The JMB terrorists were executed by the Caretaker Government after due legal process but no act of revenge followed that went to prove that AL accusations and Indian media reports that Bangladesh was infested with Al Qaeda and Islamic terrorists was exaggerated and largely untrue. During this period, United States also did not find any evidence that Bangladeshi Islamic fundamentalist parties had Al Qaeda connections. Their concern was to contain the Islamic terrorism at home that was growing due to BNP Government's sponsorship.

Islamic terrorism has become benign with the fall of the BNP Government at a time when internationally Islamic terrorist groups are weakening. Newsweek in its June 9th edition under the caption “New Face of Islam” writes that within the Islamic world, a critique of radicalism is growing. Moderate Islamic scholars who were silent before and after 9/11 are now beginning to speak out against Islamic terrorism. Clerics who had supported Bin Laden are now distancing themselves from him. Countries that have tolerated Islamic radicalism like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are now encouraging moderation. In Saudi Arabia, 10,000 Government paid imams have been asked by King Abdullah to restrain their zealous excesses. A new realisation is now afloat in the Islamic world that the “apocalyptic notion of holy war” that Laden had promoted contradicts the fundamental message of Islam, which is peace. Al Qaeda is now on the run in Iraq, its haven after US invasion of Afghanistan, where the US forces are winning. As a result of worldwide hunt, Al Qaeda is no longer in any position to encourage international terrorism as its finances and infrastructure have been considerably weakened.

These positive developments offer Bangladesh a great opportunity to re-establish its liberal traditions. The mainstream parties have the most critical role to play. The BNP must not repeat its past mistakes and must rein in Jamaat, with whom it is again very likely to form election alliance. It should also not allow Jamaat to nominate anyone for the next general elections with blood on its hands for its role in 1971, knowing how much the people detest the war criminals. The AL must fight Islamic radicalism in the country politically and refrain from giving the international media wrong impression about Bangladesh by talking of our internal politics abroad as it did during the BNP era. It must also be consistent in dealing with Islamic fundamentalist forces. It has not fully explained to the people its election alliance with Khelafat-e-Majlish, a fundamentalist Islamic party that supports the fatwa, just before the postponed 2007 elections as well as its alliance during the first BNP term with the Jamaat to force the BNP out of power. It also needs to explain why during its tenure it did not deal with the war criminals.

The role of the civil societies and sector commanders of our liberation forces is critical here. Those who committed war crimes in 1971 should be tried under law as murderers and rapists, remembering that there is no statute of limitation here.

Those in Jamaat-e-Islami who are war criminals must be brought under the law. Jamaat's opposition to Bangladesh's independence is a political issue and must be dealt politically. Unfortunately, in pursuing the war criminals, these groups have called for banning Jamaat as a political party, only indirectly labeling it as a party of war criminals. They have also used the secularism card in seeking to ban Jamaat because of its belief in Islam, claiming secularism as fundamental to our statehood. In doing so, they have overlooked that democracy gives all political parties the right to address their beliefs to the people directly who as sovereign authority accept or reject them.

They have also insensitively set aside the importance of Islam as a way of life both in literal and spiritual sense to majority of Bangladeshis. Furthermore, the belief in Islam that helps people retain mental sanity in the face of extreme poverty and unbearable natural and manmade calamities that they face regularly has also been over-looked. Islam based parties, particularly Jamaat, may thus be getting the benefit of over-kill with the secular card because a lot of people feel that those attacking the Jamaat are also targeting Islam.

Sadly, the detested war criminals may also be getting the reprieve by moves to ban Islam based parties from politics. The fact that the groups seeking to ban Jamaat are also supporters of the Awami League is also taking the wind out of the sail for trial of the war criminals with which few people differ. Just as the West has made the mistake of putting Islam in the dock, because of Al Qaeda, those seeking trial of war criminals have similarly erred by bringing Islam into the equation. This could eventually lead to sympathy for Islamic parties arising from the perception that Islam is in peril. For tackling Islamic fundamentalism, these groups must therefore ensure that they do not put Islam and secularism in conflict for there is no reason to do so. Because of Bangladesh's liberal traditions and that in case of a conflict, Islam is going to get the majority nod over secularism.

History, internal politics and recent developments in the Islamic world do not therefore place Bangladesh in imminent danger of a takeover by fundamentalist Islamic forces. These notwithstanding, the next elected Government must bear in mind that there are 9000 Government registered madrasas and 15,000 Qawami madrasas and Islamic fundamentalist parties like Jagrato Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), Shahadat-e-al-Hikma, Al-Harakat-ul-Islamia, Harkat-ul-Jehad Islami and Al-Khidmat. These institutions and parties would need strict surveillance by the intelligence agencies to keep them on track which should not be difficult if the next Government is sincere about it.

Whether Bangladesh becomes a haven for international Islamic terrorists and whether Islamic fundamentalism plagues our politics will thus depend largely on the mainstream political parties and the civil societies. The Islamic parties by themselves have the ability to cause disturbances but little possibility of doing much more. It is time that the mainstream parties and the civil societies work together in the interest of the nation and ensure our liberal Islamic heritage. There is no reason for complacency about Islamic terrorism in Bangladesh but no reason to cry wolf either.

The Minister and the Media

Published in The Daily Star, June 29, 2008

I had an interesting argument recently with a former adviser of the caretaker government on the excessive indulgence of the advisers with the media. This was at a typical Dhaka dinner party. As soon as I explained my views on the issue, he dismissed them summarily. He argued that transparency required ministers/advisers to interact with the media regularly because people have a right to know about government policy from the horse's mouth. He further argued that for the CTG, the importance of advisers talking to the media is indispensable because the parliament has been abrogated.

I held my ground that neither transparency nor policy dictated that ministers/advisers should be so excessively involved with the media. I based my arguments on practices elsewhere, suggesting that ministers/advisers nowhere interact with the media the way they do in Bangladesh. I cited Japan where ministers deal with transparency of governance in parliament while bureaucrats deal with the media, unless a national crisis requires the minister to talk to the media.

I also argued that policies were not black and white issues upon which ministers/advisers could talk to the media without creating confusion and compromising on secrecy and confidentiality. I further argued that when a minister/adviser erred before the media, he would be unable to backtrack without embarrassing the government, which was one strong reason why media specialists in bureaucracy interact with the media instead. The ex-adviser was not at all satisfied with my arguments.

He is not alone in his point of view. On any given evening, advisers or ministers have had a difficult time following their media appearances on newscasts of private TV channels. Such indulgences have not served the need of transparency or explained policy to the people, but have landed ministers and advisers in trouble. With all the advisers talking to the media constantly with no holds barred, the government appears like a hydra-headed creature, without focus or sense of direction.

Things were not like this when we became independent. A minister in 1970s used to make an urgent call to the Establishment Ministry upon assuming oath of office. The reason was to get an ex-CSP officer as a private secretary for his pride and prestige. He would then make another important call to the Information Ministry for the best information officer (IO), the official spokesman of the ministry. The information officer acted as the link between the media and the government on all issues of media interest, with the secretary and/or the minister speaking to the media only when issues were of national importance. Today every ministry has an IO, who is still the official ministry spokesman but his job has been unofficially taken over by the minister/adviser, leaving him doing personal chores for his boss. In the process, our ministers/advisers have become the most visible in the world -- like media stars in constant media glare. That visibility has, unfortunately, not improved governance; hampering it instead. Something is amiss here.

It was during the decade-long Ershad tenure that the information officer's job was usurped gradually by the minister because of the president's interest in the media for personal reasons. As a usurper, he needed legitimacy. He knew that the media could give him great assistance there. So he interacted with the media both overtly and covertly, but not for reasons of transparency or desire to explain his government's policy. His intentions were more sinister, where the underlying belief was that the more he could motivate the media in his favour, the greater would he have legitimacy for himself and his government. The ministers followed Ershad, and turned the government into propaganda machinery, where they depended less on bureaucrats to deal with the media. Thus the minister unofficially took over the job of the information officer to a large extent, although the information officer still disseminated some information to the media.

Ershad's fall ushered in the parliamentary system. In a parliamentary system, the government remains in power as long as it has the confidence of the majority members in parliament. The parliament collectively or individually quizzes every minister, the prime minister included, on any policy matter. The committee system further allows the parliament to look into the working of all ministries in a manner where complete transparency can be achieved. Thus, very little is really left for the public that would require the media to knock at a minister's door, apart from routine functions of governance that could and should be left to the bureaucrats to handle.

However, in the case of Bangladesh, ministers continued with their media indulgence although the change to the parliamentary system did not require it either for transparency or for bringing the public on board on policy. The ministers' interaction with the media increased a great deal with the gradual expansion of the media, climaxing in the private TV explosion during the last BNP era, which have treated the ministers as media stars. These factors notwithstanding, the ministers loved their media role for one of the major reasons that had motivated Ershad: a desire to see their names in print and their faces on TV.

The advisers of the CTG have the added excuse to indulge with the media because the parliament is not in session. The consequences, nevertheless, are the same: transparency or public needs remain mere excuses, while the government is embarrassed through such indulgence for no good reason. The excessive media appearances of the advisers give the impression that they are running this government through the media. In doing so, they do not realise that they are causing themselves and the CTG embarrassment, because they often end up contradicting themselves and one another. To complicate matters, the media often, intentionally or otherwise, covers these interactions in a subjective manner.

A lot of us former diplomats were disappointed to see the foreign affairs adviser appearing together with the outgoing British High Commissioner in front of the media, after the latter had met him for his farewell call that was a routine diplomatic event. By appearing together, the adviser had to watch the BHC talk on our internal affairs in direct contravention of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, something the adviser could and should have easily avoided. A simple statement by director general of external publicity or the information officer of MFA about the farewell call would have been both appropriate and professional.

Advisers often talk to the media in the corridors of the Secretariat, at the airport, in fact, where not? This is not the picture of a professional government, for governance is a more serious business, and has to be conducted behind public and media glare. In the absence of the parliament, there is perhaps the need for them to interact more with the media. They have, however, gone overboard with this interaction. In place of transparency and awareness of policy, the people end up utterly confused by these excessive interactions, where professional bureaucrats with media experience could have served the government and the people's needs much better, as they do in all other governments.

Our governance has many problems. A lot of that arises from the tendency of the people at the top acting for personal interests by breaking rules and procedures and then using catchy phrases such as transparency and people's rights to justify some of these egotistic actions. As we look towards the next elected government, we also need to try to make our governance professional. We need to seriously make efforts that the ministers in the elected government do not follow the indulgence of the advisers with the media. Towards that objective, the next parliament should deal with concern for transparency and awareness about policy.

The ministers should concern themselves with the serious task of implementing government policies and goals. The bureaucrats should handle the media regarding the work of the ministers and the ministries. Let the elected government give the information officer his job back, with some changes. Taking into view the media explosion and increased media interest in governance, perhaps it would be wise to consider upgrading the status of the information officer, whose rank now is that of an assistant secretary, to that of a deputy or a joint-secretary.

It also does not show this government in good light to see on TV screens, for example, three or four advisers talking to the media day in and day out on the political dialogue, where they look amateurish and also end up contradicting their statements from one day to the next. A professional media spokesman from the bureaucracy could have spared the advisers embarrassment, while allowing them time to concentrate on the dialogue.

Export Targets for Bangladesh Embassy and Economic Diplomacy

Published in The Daily Star, June 7, 2008

HE Commerce Secretary recently announced a number of stern measures including closing down or relocating commercial wings of Bangladesh Embassies for failure to meet his Ministry's export targets. This reminded me of my own experience with export targets as an Ambassador. My first tryst with export targets came in Egypt when the Commerce Secretary expressed disappointment in a letter after my Embassy failed to meet the target. That depressed me but not for too long for soon I learnt that the Embassy that topped the list as the most successful Embassy was one in the Middle East that was headed by a non-career Ambassador, a former private college Principal, whose main concern was politics with the Bangladeshi community. In Japan, in the space of a few months, I was once “congratulated” by the Commerce Secretary for surpassing the “target” but “reprimanded “the following quarter when the Embassy fell short. In four years in Japan, I was “congratulated “and “reprimanded” on export targets without realizing why my Embassy “failed” or "succeeded!” The strange fact was that there was really no tangible reason for such failure or success.

I hope readers do not get any wrong impression because the issue is a very serious one for Bangladesh. We either export more or perish. We are just on the wrong track. When I was in Japan, I was very interested to know the reasons behind Thailand's dramatic inroads into the Japanese market. In the 1970s, Thailand's export to Japan was a few hundred million US dollars. By 2002, Thailand was exporting to Japan in just poultry alone, more than US $ 2 billion. The Thai Ambassador in Japan who became a good friend explained the reasons. He said that the dramatic expansion in Thailand's export to Japan was the result of nearly 3 decades of painstaking work of the Thai private sector. Since the early 70s, the Thai private sector had targeted Japan by participating regularly in trade fairs there in the areas where they had potentials. By such participation, the Thai private sector won the confidence of the Japanese private sector in commodities of comparative advantage and expanded its exports that are now worth several billion US dollars. The Thai Foreign Ministry and its Embassy in Japan created the favourable field for its private sector by providing critical market information; negotiating favourable bilateral trade deals through which import restrictions were relaxed/removed; and backed its private sector in a manner that created confidence of the Japanese importers. In actual export, the Thai Embassy or its Government did not come into the scene directly for that was not their business.

The Thai experience is relevant for us to understand that we are on the wrong track. Our export targets are set arbitrarily. The Commerce Ministry does not consult the Embassies in setting targets. Embassies are given figures and a list of commodities without the platform to interface with the actual sellers, the exporters. They are thus “shadow” sellers who never see the goods they are asked to sell. To complicate matters further, they often find items in their list that they alone know would just not sell within the year for a variety of reasons as lists are prepared not just arbitrarily but also without professional market survey. When I was in Japan, pharmaceutical was one item in my mission's list. That was an impossible task for achieving in a year for import requirements for pharmaceuticals into Japan was and still is a very complex issue. Our pharmaceuticals have good prospect in Japan but it would require many years of coordinated efforts of the Embassy, the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Commerce to achieve the desired result.

Another questionable aspect about export targets is the importance it places on the officers of the Commercial Wing to achieve it given their background. A Commercial Counselor/First Secretary is chosen from non-BCS (FA) cadres, often a District Commissioner or a Customs/Income Tax officer. To expect such an officer to be able to deliver the export targets in a foreign environment, sometimes where language is a barrier is a fond wish and the weakest link in the entire process of setting export targets. There is also a very serious misperception about how diplomacy and diplomats work.

The most serious flaw, however, is the fact that export targets for Embassies are unrealistic. In a post cold war globalized world, governments are no longer directly involved in international trade. Today it is entirely a private sector matter where governments create the right environment for such trade. Rules and regulations for it are set in forums such as the WTO and bilateral trade negotiators. Governments and diplomatic missions today concentrate all their efforts to get the maximum advantage for their private sector for exporting commodities across national frontiers through such negotiations and with professional market information/assistance which automatically enhances exports.

There is thus a serious disconnect in both policy formulation and its implementation in the way we are trying to increase exports. All governments have export targets but as a part of that country's economic diplomacy. Unfortunately, we have no economic diplomacy except slogans and vague notions. In the 15 years of elected governments, a lot has been said about economic diplomacy. Yet nowhere in government is there a concept paper about what this means to our overall diplomacy. More vague still is the operating mechanism for achieving the goals of our so-called economic diplomacy that are often set arbitrarily and in an ad-hoc manner. The dangers of this are all around but no one takes notice while the country suffers. When BNP came in 2001, the Industries Ministry cancelled two agreements that were signed with China and Japan by the AL Government disregarding the views of the Foreign Ministry and international law! It upset China and Japan and stalled bilateral relations till the projects, DAP 1 and DAP 11, were reactivated a year and a half after cancellation. This is just one example in a long list of serious flaws in the implementing mechanism of a nonexistent policy of economic diplomacy. While posted in Japan, I felt that Japan could be extremely important for Bangladesh as an investment destination, the way it was in the case of the Malaysian economic miracle. As a result of historical problems between Japan and China, hundreds of billions of USD of Japan's investments in China have become unstable in recent years. Many Japanese investors are seriously considering relocating their investments in China in a new destination where Bangladesh can and has figured seriously to the Japanese given our large population, being a bridge between South and Southeast Asia and the prospects of South Asia being a free trade area under SAFTA. I tried my best to impress the government about this prospect by the only means available, addressing letters that interested nobody at home as there was no single authority to take lead in such matters. When Prime Minister Khaleda Zia visited Japan in 2005, her address at an investment seminar was attended by some 250 Japanese businessmen and investors, a few corporate giants among them, but did not lead to anything substantial as she was unable to impress them with any clear vision of what Bangladesh could do to attract Japanese investment. Our oft-repeated cliché that Bangladesh is the best investment destination in our region is a stale one and has no takers. Khaleda Zia failed to take advantage to impress her Japanese audience because her government then had no policy on economic diplomacy. It still does not have one.

No crystal ball is needed to predict that the stern warning of the Commerce Secretary will have no impact; it will merely have a Que Sera Sera outcome. Given the importance of exports for Bangladesh, however, it is imperative that we develop very urgently our so-called economic diplomacy into a detailed and professional one; streamline the mechanism for its implementation; and fit our need to increase exports as part of it. We have a very vibrant private sector today that has turned our exports from almost nothing to a multibillion US dollar industry with very little help of the government. It needs the government and embassies now to make the playing field for international trade favourable for them by protecting their interests in multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations; with in-depth information of the market abroad for access; and helping them establish contacts with business abroad to achieve the success of Thailand. If they are professional in helping the private sector, exports will increase much faster. The need to set targets for Embassies would become totally redundant, as it should. Unfortunately, most Bangladesh Embassies are not assisting the private sector pro-actively, partly due to their shortcomings and partly due to lack of pro-active direction from home. Half of Bangladesh Missions have no website and those that have are not professional websites that would meet our private sector's requirements. Finally, here is a question for the Commerce Secretary. Suppose an Embassy in a developed country failed to meet the so-called targets. Where would he re-locate that mission's commerce wing? Timbuktu? Economic diplomacy, exports included, is a serious matter that does not work by threats and arbitrariness!

The Prime Minister's Office: A Critical reform Area

Published in The Daily Star, May 31, 2008

THESE days we are talking of reforms in governance and institutions of governance and very rightly so. We hear of reform of the Public Service Commission, the Election Commission, Police administration, etc. Yet one office at the nerve centre of governance that attained a great deal of notoriety under elected governments and added significantly to the deterioration of governance, the Prime Minister's Office, or the PMO, has so far escaped attention. To bring the point home, this is what happened to the top PMO officials under Khaleda Zia's premiership. She sent her own secretary to jail. At present her principal secretary is accused for corruption; another secretary is in jail for corruption; one of her political advisers is also in jail while another has been convicted and at present a fugitive from justice.

A friend, former officer of the Pakistan Foreign Service cadre, was cleared for promotion to the rank of a Grade B Ambassador/Additional Secretary in 2003 by the SSB chaired by the cabinet secretary. Just after the conclusion of the meeting, a phone call came from a PMO official asking the cabinet secretary not to proceed with the promotions. The case was stuck for the next 3 months. When it was cleared, my friend had retired! Scores of such promotion cases duly cleared by SSB and sent routinely to the PMO for signature were by-passed by low functionaries at the PMO for political reasons. Under the last BNP Government, a political adviser with his staff ran a parallel office at the PMO as an extension of the party office or the 'Hawa Bhavan' often rendering the principal secretary and PMO officers innocuous and silent spectators. We have read in newspaper reports about the principal secretary and a private secretary to a political adviser “fighting” over the latter's alleged corruption but unable to take action against this gentleman for his political linkage. The charge against this official was that he had acquired property illegally at Gulshan worth crores of taka.

The PMO was established in 1991 when Bangladesh adopted the parliamentary system. It replaced the President's Office where two Presidents with military background had created a very powerful secretariat. It was expected that with change of system, the PMO would lose a lot of power with Ministers sharing executive authority with the Prime Minister. That did not happen because the Prime Minister assumed almost all the powers of the President, helped by the failure of the Parliament to evolve as a meaningful branch of Government. Also, unlike other parliamentary governments, Article 55 (2) of Bangladesh Constitution stated that “the executive power of the Republic shall, in accordance with this Constitution, be exercised by or on the authority of the Prime Minister “that in effect made the system Prime Ministerial instead of a truly parliamentary one where the Prime Minister is ”the first among equals”.

The Prime Minister's dominance was reflected in an un-healthy manner in the way the PMO became a government within the government, to the exclusion of the rest of the government. The Rules of Business and Allocations of Business were suitably amended to legalize the dominance that ran contrary to the parliamentary system and kept the ministers from playing their role in governance. Ministers were vying for attention of not the Prime Minister but bureaucrats at the PMO and were busy building their “power base” by closeness with those bureaucrats who found key posts at the PMO for political reasons as the elected governments politicized it.

In a parliamentary system, political parties play a crucial role in getting a government elected. However, once it is chosen, they are not expected to have any role in governance for once in government; the party in power has to appeal to the nation that has to include everybody, including the supporters of those it has defeated in the elections. In Bangladesh, this did not happen and the parties even when in power seldom overcame narrow party interests to appeal to the broader national constituency. Thus bipartisanship and consensus around national issues never evolved in our politics. At the PMO this play of narrow party interests over broader national interests was played out in the worst ways imaginable. Party officials were brought into governance as political advisers and given offices at the PMO to perform functions “relating to Political Affairs” as entrusted by the Allocations of Business. Career bureaucrats were brought to the PMO on political considerations rather than on merit. Between the political advisers and the bureaucrats, it was just not the PMO that was politicized; together they spread the virus to the entire administration. In the last BNP era, the political advisers with the politicized bureaucrats helped the party take over the PMO and through the PMO, the entire government. Ministers were spending more time to get attention of one political adviser in particular and the “political” bureaucrats there who worked as the party's men at the PMO. The Prime Minister's son at the party office or the Hawa Bhavan encouraged the nexus and the PMO became the front for the party. This nexus became the real power at the PMO leading the ministers to seek the attention of this political adviser more than her secretariat staff including the principal secretary because the blessings of Hawa Bhavan decided most crucial issues of governance. During the last BNP government, a private secretary was the PM's nephew that helped him gain influence way out of proportion to what he deserved and helped in the PMO to evolve as an obstacle to good governance.

During the AL Government, when the PMO had not fallen to such low depths, a senior retired CSP officer who was entrusted to review the administration had called for dismantling it. In a BBC talk show a few years ago, the editor of TDS had said something extremely valuable. While acknowledging that Bangladesh had made good strides towards democracy he felt that for further evolution down the road of democracy Bangladesh would have to find ways to make the Prime Minister accountable in between the elections. That would need a lot of things falling into place, like making the parliament truly functional. If we are seeking to restrain our Prime Ministers from assuming dictatorial powers, as they have done, we could also look into whether we can amend Article 55 (2) of the Constitution and re-invest executive powers in the cabinet. Those issues notwithstanding, the reform of the PMO has become essential and critical for achieving good governance of future elected governments.

The reform of the PMO must start by addressing a major issue, drawing a line between the party and the government. The Prime Minister's role as party leader and his/her need to lead it is undoubtedly very important. But that function must be performed at the party office and not at the PMO. ROB should then be amended and the PMO should be relieved from its role in dealing with political affairs. That would not allow the political advisers to sit at the PMO and free it from party interference. The provisions under schedule V of the Allocations of Business that sets aside cases that ministries must refer to the Prime Minister should also be trimmed so as not to burden the PMO with cases that are routine. As an example, cases of promotion of Deputy Secretary should not be referred by the Establishment Division to the PMO. In trimming schedule V, the spirit should be to free the Prime Minister to concentrate on more serious affairs of the state at the policy level and correspondingly allow the Ministers to play their proper role in governance. The personnel at the PMO must be chosen strictly on merit and the chain of command there under the principal secretary should not be broken by outside interference. On the conflict of interest issue, no close relative of future PMs should be appointed to any post at the PMO.

The most important objective of reform of the PMO must be to free it from political interference and bring professionalism to it. Towards the end of the BNP Government, public confidence in government was all but shattered because of the unholy nexus between the PMO and the Hawa Bhavan. That nexus should not be allowed in the next elected government. The reforms would create that environment but whether the nexus would not be repeated would depend to a large extent upon the next Prime Minister who we hope would come reformed as a consequence of developments in our politics since 1/11. While the PM's choice would be made by the election, the principal secretary would be selected. That selection should be made with great care keeping in mind that he would be the individual on whose personality and leadership qualities a reformed and professional PMO would like to make a new beginning where it would be the cause of removal of people's sufferings instead of being the cause of it.

Bangladesh's potentials are immense; we are the envy of our neighbours because of our history and our homogeneity. Yet we are languishing, hovering between hopes and despair because we have failed to establish bipartisanship in our politics. The PMO is not a party office, and by re-establishing that through the reforms suggested, Bangladesh could make a long awaited start towards bipartisan politics whose impact on the country could be the beginning of the realization of the dreams for which we had established Bangladesh through immense sacrifices.

Our foreign policy and the foreign ministry

Published in The Daily Star, May 17, 2008

RETIRED Ambassadors were unanimous on two issues in a Round Table (RT) organized by The Daily Star (TDS) and the Centre for Foreign Affairs Studies (CFAS) recently. First, foreign policy is not important in governance in Bangladesh. Second, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Bangladesh is “the weakest in the world”. It is not that these apprehensions are new. People informed on these issues have known these for a long time.

What is new and important is that this RT has brought foreign policy and the MFA into focus at a time when it is in our national interest to do so. Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, international relations are being rewritten faster than most nations can keep pace. Globalization and 9/11 have added new dimensions in international politics that nations have to adapt on a continuous basis for furthering national interests, making successful conduct of foreign policy crucial to all Governments. As a consequence of it all, Foreign Ministries all over the world have gained more power and influence. The TDS-CFAS RT in this context is a timely warning that Bangladesh is harming its own national interests by going against the trend.

It is a pity that we find ourselves in this situation today. We were liberated by blood in 1971 at a time when international law did not favour liberation by exercise of the right of self-determination. It was sheer merit of our cause, heroism of our people and the genocide of the Pakistani Army that swept world opinion in our favour when such was not the case in similar efforts in Sri Lanka and Nigeria where the Biafran struggle dissipated. Immediately after our liberation, it was because of our successful foreign policy that we swiftly became members of the UN, OIC and other world bodies, and established bilateral relations with most of the countries of the world. The MFA successfully charted the course for the nation that allowed Bangladesh safe landing and acceptance in the committee of nations. By 1979, we won a seat at the UN Security Council defeating Japan. In 1981, we came close to becoming the President of the UN General Assembly, a position we lost to Iraq by a coin toss after a tie on the votes cast.

By the time President Ershad usurped power, foreign policy and MFA were on the decline. One major reason for this is interesting; in the period immediately after liberation, when foreign policy was important, MFA officials led by the ex-Pakistan Foreign Service (PFS) officers were enjoying both recognition and prominence. The elite members of the ex-Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) were at that time in particular threat from the politicians. Some of the senior members of this service made an informal proposal to the ex-PFS officers in the MFA to form a Foreign Service Cadre together that was snubbed by the latter on the principle of inter seniority. That was a mistake for by the time Ershad came, these ex-CSP officers were very powerful. In fact, some senior ex-CSP officers helped Ershad overthrow the elected Government of Justice Sattar and became very close to him. Ershad disliked the Foreign Service that these ex-CSP officers used to full measure. They systematically destroyed the MFA, dividing the entire gamut of foreign relations into diplomatic, aid, trade, consular and other components, and distributing all except the diplomatic to a number of Ministries, Division and agencies and incorporated the changes into the Rules of Business.

The MFA and foreign policy had thus been relegated to the backseat by the time Ershad fell. Elected Governments that returned in 1991 carried forward the trend although our national interests required greater attention and importance to foreign policy to adjust to the new and emerging realities of a post Cold War world. While other countries strengthened their Foreign Ministry to meet new challenges that also opened new opportunities, we weakened it. We just did not allow foreign affairs to be shared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs together with a number of other Ministries; no effort was made to set up any mechanism for coordination. As one retired Ambassador commented at the TDS-CFAS RT, our foreign policy had become a hydra-headed creature without focus. Those in charge were happy to weaken the MFA and did not care or consider they were harming our national interests.

MFA under elected Governments thus was captain of a ship where its crews owed it no loyalty. It was therefore only logical that during this period we really had no foreign policy but a series of reactions to situations, mostly initiated at the instruction of the Prime Minister's Office. In the Missions, Ambassadors were as helpless as MFA in the country. As Ambassador to Japan, I was picking a lot of information from newspapers that I read on the internet on what the ERD or other economic Ministries were doing with Japan so as not to be embarrassed with the host Government as it was seldom that these Ministries kept me informed on developments. Left without substance in formulating and implementing foreign policy, MFA came up with high sounding policies like Economic Diplomacy during the AL tenure from 1996-2001; the so called Look East policy of the BNP Government and now the Ten Points Policy of the Caretaker Government. These policies have no concept papers. They have not been formulated through consultations with stakeholders and just been drawn out of the hat! To complicate matters, MFA often tried to first guess the mind of the Prime Minister and important officials at the PMO to deal with foreign policy issues. As Foreign Minister, Morshed Khan was aware that the Prime Minister had reservation about India. Instead of attempting to remove these reservations, he built upon it to be on her right side. In a now well-known tirade, he humiliated India at a Seminar in 2004 in unbelievable language to win the PM's attention. It is therefore no wonder that while India is for geopolitical and other reasons our most important neighbor; we do not have an India policy. In fact, substantive matters with India are not dealt by the MFA and often Ministries who deal with these issues, keep the MFA in darkness! We have not demarcated our maritime boundary with India. We have failed to uphold our best interests in multilateral economic negotiations where our performance at WTO negotiations, led by the Commerce Ministry, was so miserable that we were officially extended support by the UN to develop the negotiating skills of those who represent us there, skills available to MFA officers but not used. The sum total of neglect to foreign affairs and weakening the MFA has marginalized Bangladesh. We have no articulated and coordinated policy on issues as critical as climate change and global warming, on our interests in the WTO, on how to deal with India, etc.

The MFA, sadly, has helped this process rather than stand against it. Those in leadership role in the Ministry opted for their personal interests, like promotions and postings instead of opposing the efforts of those in power to relegate foreign affairs into the back drawer and make MFA weak. They allowed influx of army officers whose seniority destroyed the morale of the directly recruited officers. They also failed to oppose for fear of upsetting the Prime Minister and the PMO, wrong decisions taken at the latter's behest like the NAM Chairmanship in 1998 and Salauddin Qader Chowdhury's nomination for the OIC Secretary General's post in 2004 which given to any other candidate of MFA's choice could have won Bangladesh the post.

The need now is to reverse this process and allow the MFA to play a major role in formulating and implementing the country's foreign policy for the sake of Bangladesh. This is the trend worldwide and therefore is nothing new. An example of how MFA functions elsewhere was given at the TDS-CFAS RT. One Ambassador who was High Commissioner in India said at the RT that after he and the then Indian Finance Minister had fixed the latter's visit to Dhaka, the Finance Minister called the High Commissioner to inform him that he was embarrassed to cancel the visit because the Joint Secretary of the Bangladesh Division at the Indian External Affairs Ministry thought the dates were not suitable. Another retired Ambassador gave the example of Brazil where their MFA is the government within the government, a trend that most nations are now following in one degree or another.

It is simply our national interest that requires functions of aid, external trade and expatriate welfare to be given to the MFA together with the coordinating role for foreign policy related functions now being handled by other Ministries. The former NBR Chairman Badiur Raman made a very good case of this by stating in a talk show that with less than one digit dependence on foreign aid in our development needs, it is a disgrace that we have a Division called the ERD. In arguing the case of the Foreign Ministry, it may help us to bear in mind that in implementing foreign policy, diplomacy is of essence. Diplomacy is a specialized profession; the longer time one spends in this profession, the better that individual gets and the better that individual serves the country. The diplomatic cadre in Bangladesh works under the MFA. By bringing foreign policy related functions to the MFA, the country will have professionals dealing with such matters. Why would we do otherwise?

The Foreign Ministry has deteriorated over the years of neglect in its cadre potentials. To take the extra functions, the diplomatic cadre must be expanded by inducting officers from other Ministries and also from the private sector. Efforts must be made to attract people with special qualifications. Our expats in developed countries could be a potential source. Training, specialization and language skills must be made the key elements of the expanded Foreign Service cadre. Within these parameters, we should pursue clearly set out foreign policy goals that are achievable.

The biggest challenge to evolving a foreign policy of Bangladesh to serve the best interests of the country will be to successfully bring the stakeholders such as the political parties, business groups, and civil societies into the loop in the process of formulation of foreign policy. Once Parliament is in place, the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs should be given a major role in foreign policy formulation where bipartisanship of political parties in approaching foreign policy issues should be made indispensible. Finally, under the elected Government, the country must have a Foreign Minister with background and qualifications for the job that we did not have in the 15 years of elected Government for which the country has suffered. The icing on the cake must come from the Prime Minister who must be the country's number one diplomat by taking a proactive and knowledge based interest in foreign policy for which the bureaucratic walls that the PMO has created in the last 15 years should fall in favour of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Responsibility of Diplomats in Host Country

Published in The Daily Star, April 4, 2008

Article 41 paragraph 1 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations states in unequivocal terms: "Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving state. They also have a duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of that state." The paragraph does not lend itself to any confusion or conflict in interpretation, and it is respected in every world capital except Dhaka, unfortunately.

I spent 30 years as a diplomat, and I never saw this Article violated anywhere as it is in Bangladesh. Diplomats are privileged, and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations exempts them from legal action, taxation, and a host of other things in the host country, but restricts them unequivocally, by the provisions of Article 41 paragraph 1, from interfering in the internal affairs of the host country.

The charge-de-affaires (CDA) of a country recently met with the AL and BNP top leadership to discuss the election roadmap under the full glare of the media. A number of ambassadors of western countries in Dhaka have been discussing about our internal affairs for quite some time now. During the BNP regime, people gathered a lot of information about inside developments in our politics from these ambassadors' regular media appearances. Their indulgence came to such a head that then foreign minister tried to resolve it because of the embarrassment it was causing the government. Unfortunately, Foreign Minister Morshed Khan went about this in an unprofessional manner, calling the ambassadors "trade unionists," and that too in the media, which further complicated the matter.

Instead of stopping, the ambassadors did the opposite, which encouraged the opponents of the BNP and a large section of the media who failed to see the diplomatic violations but not the embarrassment it was causing the BNP government. The emergence of a good number of private TV channels after 2001 encouraged these diplomats to talk openly and freely.

The role of a high commissioner is a case in point. In the last 4 years he has represented his country in Bangladesh, his "public" posture has been interesting. There is not one domestic issue upon which he has not cared to comment publicly; on our governance, elections, corruption etc.

Bangladesh's politics is far from perfect. We also depend a great deal upon economic aid from our development partners. This relationship sometimes forces us to accept conditions on how we spend their assistance, as well as on issues of governance, because some countries such as the UK tie their assistance to good governance. Ambassadors use this aid issue to express their views on our internal affairs.

These actions of the ambassadors and their missions often also benefit us. However, when ambassadors use the media for conducting such actions where the government is criticised and embarrassed openly, the whole issue turns indecent and bizarre. It is not just that these actions conflict with the Article 43 Paragraph 1 and embarrass the government, they end up humiliating and embarrassing the people of the country.

In 2000, I watched the Egyptian election very closely, where President Mubarak won with over 90% votes, with the opposition almost totally gagged. I did not find any ambassador, US and the British included, giving any critical opinion on that election, other than perhaps in their secret dispatches to their governments or discreet meetings with Egyptian officials, or in very private conversation. We don't see any ambassadors of these countries criticising the governments in the glare of the media as they do in Bangladesh.

Constructive criticism from ambassadors of friendly countries is not, per se, a bad thing. But then, such criticism must be communicated in confidence. No country that has pride, the Vienna Convention notwithstanding, will accept ambassadors so freely criticising its politics or governance before the media as these diplomats do in our country. By these violations, we as a nation are being humiliated without achieving anything positive, because the problems remain where they are. In fact, without realising, these diplomats just complicate the problems further.

There is no doubt that these diplomats are also aware of the Vienna Convention. Why then do they violate this Convention? I was given an insight into this when I was recently discussing this issue with three senior editors. One of them said that it was our politicians who were to be blamed for the way diplomats behaved. When an opposition political party is unable to make the party in power listen to their fair demands, they find the latter receptive only when they get the diplomats from western missions on their side. Another editor told me that the CDA of a country met with the AL and the BNP because of frantic calls from both the parties to meet her to get the US on their side for their current political agenda..

The Foreign Ministry must step in and tell the diplomats firmly that the Government of Bangladesh wants them to adhere strictly to article 41 of the Vienna Convention. Simultaneously, ministries/departments of the government must be careful about meeting ambassadors and high commissioners. I do not see any reason why the ACC chief or the CEC should be meeting with them, unless the latter have issues related to aid and assistance to discuss with them.

The media has a very important role to play here. Unfortunately, despite the fact that we have such a vibrant media, it lacks maturity in diplomatic reporting and has little knowledge of diplomatic nuances and practices. They seek out ambassadors and high commissioners like media personalities, and ask them questions that have no relevance at all to the task for which their countries have sent them here. The media should keep in mind that the diplomats cannot have any public opinion about our internal affairs, and it is just not the right thing to ask them such questions. If they want to speak on our internal affairs, these reporters should remind them the relevant article of the Vienna Convention instead.

The political parties have a bigger role to play. They know more than anyone else that by discussing the country's internal affairs with foreign ambassadors and high commissioners, they are humiliating the country to take political advantage against their opponents, advantage that ultimately does not even materialise. It is not just that they are humiliating their own country; they are also humiliating themselves.

People outside Bangladesh will find it hard to believe that the top political leaders of Bangladesh's two major political parties have held meetings with the CDA of a particular country to discuss the country's election roadmap in the glare of the print and electronic media. The political parties must stop this immediately, for their own sake and for the sake of the country's pride. They can interact with these diplomats, but they should do so outside the glare of the media and be discreet about these interactions.

The diplomats who are violating the Vienna Convention have the ultimate responsibility of putting things in order here. Diplomats must realise that their more than frequent press and media appearances and meetings with host government officials and politicians on issues of the country's internal affairs and politics give rise to beliefs and perceptions in the public mind that are incorrect, and could even adversely affect their bilateral relations with Bangladesh while in no way helping to improve our politics or governance. They should also realise that no other capital would allow such violation of the Vienna Convention.

Diplomacy is an art that bears the best fruit when conducted with discretion and outside media glare. It can, as it is doing in Bangladesh, spoil good intent when conducted in the press and media. The bottom line, Vienna Convention and all the rest notwithstanding, is that diplomats in Bangladesh should keep their views about our internal affairs to themselves, and if their good intentions get the better of them they should convey these views discreetly to their hosts.

National Security Council for Bangladesh

Published in The Daily Star, March 5, 2008

A US National Security Council in session

I once sat in a high profile meeting when the country had an elected government as a Director General in the Foreign Ministry. Those who attended that meeting were the Ministers of Foreign and Home Affairs with their respective Secretary and top level representatives of civil and military intelligence. Security issues were on top of the agenda of that meeting. I was astonished to learn at that meeting that on crucial national security issues, the Foreign Minister was in total darkness and that intelligence available to the military was unknown to the civil intelligence. At the Home Ministry, what the Secretary knew was not in his Minister's knowledge. Since that strange meeting, I always felt Bangladesh needed a National Security Council for a professional and transparent way to deal with national security and intelligence issues that are vital for formulating the country's foreign and defense policies.

A National Security Council or its equivalent is now an essential part of governments of most countries. It has become indispensable for professionally integrating intelligence and security issues into well considered foreign and defense policies for maintaining sovereignty and furthering national interests in an increasingly globalized world. It has been an integral part of Government in the United States since it was set up under the Presidency of President Harry Truman. In India, it was set up in 1998 when the BJP Government was in office. National Security Council of Pakistan in its current version was created in April 2004 by an Act.

Historically, National Security Council has followed a perceptible pattern in evolution. Countries with strong democratic foundations have evolved one type of NSC while a country where the presence of the military is strong has evolved a different type. The United States and India are good examples of the first type where the military and intelligence agencies are given a place in the NSC in advisory roles. Turkey is an example of the second type where its NSC called the Milli Guvenlik Kurulu has institutionalized Turkish military's dominance and influence over politics.

A NSC for Bangladesh is not a new idea. A circular was issued by the Cabinet Division in 1996 creating a 23 member NSC headed by the Prime Minister. It was given a wide range of responsibilities ranging from ensuring national security to accountability of the Government as well as dealing with internal problems tied to security. But the concept was stillborn and fizzled till this Government came to office. Going by what one reads in the newspapers, a NSC for Bangladesh seems imminent with a few suggesting that it will be in place as early as end of May.

Not everybody is of course excited that a NSC is imminent for Bangladesh. A great deal of doubt has arisen within the public as the concept has not been debated at any length by this Government. In the absence of the parliament, there is also no forum to debate this issue in a manner that can take all concerns on board. A few seminars by think tanks have attempted to debate the issue. Unfortunately, these seminars have added more doubt in the public mind. In one well-publicized seminar held recently, a sponsor went to the extent of stating to the media that a NSC should be constituted immediately in order to allow the country to benefit from all the positive developments that this Government has achieved after 1/11. His statement left no one in doubt that he was suggesting that unless the military is given a major role through the NSC, democracy would be in peril when an elected Government comes.

Therefore, in establishing a NSC in Bangladesh, a few issues must be settled first for such a Council not to be again stillborn like the attempt in 1996. Before it is delivered, it must be absolutely clear to the public that a NSC is not a civil versus military issue and that it is not a covert way of bringing the military into politics. It must also be made absolutely clear that, the mess into which the politicians have landed the country notwithstanding, the supremacy of elected representatives over un-elected ones is an undeniable fact in dealing with issues of sovereignty, security and intelligence. At the same time, a NSC should act as a reminder to elected representatives that they cannot put national interests and sovereignty into jeopardy by internal conflicts. Given our ethos as a nation where we perhaps stand uniquely on our own for sacrifices for establishing democracy, we should therefore chose as a model the US type of NSC with modifications to suit our needs (we need not have a very complex one as the US NSC is) while be careful in not going after the Turkish model that give too much prominence to the military.

A NSC for Bangladesh should be a two-tiered body. The apex tier should be headed by the Prime Minister. This body should meet at regular intervals to consider issues/papers/documents prepared by the second tier and give policy decisions on issues of national security. In addition to considering national security and intelligence issues that have direct relation to sovereignty or threat to it arising from external sources, the NSC should also be entrusted with internal crisis management that threatens sovereignty. The apex tier should in addition to the Prime Minister, have as members the Leader of the Opposition, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, and Defense (why should the Prime Minister hold this portfolio? Is politics involved here?), the Chief of the Army (in place of a Joint Chief of Staff that we do not have in Bangladesh) and the Cabinet Secretary. Chiefs of civil and military intelligence should sit in NSC meetings as advisors. The second tier should comprise bureaucrats from the Ministry of Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, Army, Navy and Air Force, the civil and military intelligence agencies, the Police and BDR. In developing such a NSC, the task of coordination and smooth flow of intelligence and information between the military, security and civilians in the second tier should be given utmost importance. A post of a National Security Adviser (NSA) should be created directly under the Prime Minister for this purpose. The NSA should be a very senior retired diplomat or an armed forces officer who should carry the rank of a Minister. In a Government structure already too bloated for reasons of rationality, the NSA could use bureaucrats at the Prime Minister's Office where a Director General with requisite number of officials could provide the NSA administrative support. Issues of national security and intelligence are matters that, despite the need for transparency, cannot be made public knowledge.

Then again, the NSC must not use such a necessity to become an extra-constitutional body. It must be accountable to the Parliament through the Prime Minister.

The inclusion of the Leader of the Opposition should allow bipartisanship in dealing with crucial national issues, something sadly lacking in our system of governance.

The military and intelligence agencies have always been dealing with security and intelligence issues keeping those in charge constitutionally to deal with such issues in darkness in the absence of an established procedure or structure. The BNP and the AL Governments allowed the military and intelligence agencies de facto veto power in security and intelligence issues in manner that was non-transparent and did not always serve the best interest of the nation. A NSC will allow a professional and transparent way of cooperation between the civil, military and intelligence agencies and integration of national security and intelligence issues into defense and foreign policies in the best interest of the country.

The necessity of a NSC cannot be over-emphasized. At the same time, it may not be wise to hurry in through because doubts have arisen in the public mind caused, no doubt, by some over enthusiastic people. Recently, Justice Habibur Rahman, former Chief Adviser, said in a seminar that military's interference in politics cannot benefit the country; his statement created substantial vibes in the public mind. Some politicians have also spoken publicly that the armed forces are seeking a safe exit for themselves given the fact that they have upset the politicians by their drive against widespread corruption in politics and governance. The Army Chief's most recent meeting with senior editors where he has cleared these misgivings categorically is very encouraging. Still doubts linger. Therefore, the imperative of a NSC for Bangladesh notwithstanding, it may be wise for this Government to draw the concept paper of a well thought out NSC and leave it to the elected Government to deliver it as an integral part of executive branch of the Government under the wings of the Prime Minister.