The Independent
22nd December, 2012
M. Serajul Islam
Najma
Heptullah, Vice President of BJP and Member of Rajya Sabha said in Dhaka
recently that the BJP will agree to the ratification of the land boundary
agreement (LBA) if it is in the interest of India. The LBA was signed in Dhaka during the visit
of the Indian Prime Minister to Dhaka in September 2011. After the Teesta
Agreement (TA) was withdrawn from the table during that visit, a pall of gloom
had descended at the Prime Minister’s Office that had expected the TA to be the
icing on the cake of successful negotiations with India leading towards a
paradigm shift in Bangladesh-India relations. When the TA was withdrawn by
India, the Bangladesh side tried to cheer itself and the nation by using the LBA
as a proof that the failure on Teesta notwithstanding, the negotiations with
India was on right track and Manmohon Singh’s visit was successful. In fact,
the Indians led the Bangladesh side to believe that the LBA was as good as a
done deal.
Instead,
the LBA got stuck at BJP’s door that refused to lend support that is crucial to
the ratification process. The BJP’s refusal should not have surprised anyone in
Bangladesh least of all those who were negotiating for Bangladesh because that is
its stated policy that India would not cede an inch of territory to another
country by agreement or otherwise. In fact, the BJP’s policy is also the Indian
stand that Bangladesh should have remembered with the Indira-Mujib Agreement of
1974 when India used the ratification excuse to deny Bangladesh the Teen Bigha
corridor (one acre of land!). With Mamata Banarjee now on warpath against the
Congress and in an irrational mood in leading her state, the prospects of the TA
being signed during the current term of the Congress led government that has
more than a year and a half to go, is remote.
As
the AL led government enters its final year in office, domestic politics in
India has taken over New Delhi’s desire and ability to resolve problems with
Bangladesh. It is no longer a question of political will on India’s part to
resolve the major problems in Bangladesh-India relations; New Delhi led by the
Congress and its allies is just not in any position to do anything for their
political survival. The elections in India will be held in the middle of 2014.
Till then, the resolution of the TA and the ratification of the LBA will remain
in cold storage. With these two major issues there, serious forward movement as
envisioned by Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh-India relations would also have to
wait till new governments are installed in Dhaka and New Delhi.
While
waiting for the changes that could be a long one, it would be useful to do some
introspection to try and understand what had motivated the Bangladesh negotiators
to put economic issues ahead of the political ones where they failed to
envisage any problem with TA and LBA and instead went gaga with Bangladesh about to become the connectivity hub of the
region to reap major economic benefits with Indian assistance. The negotiators were not fair to anyone who
raised doubts about India’s intent. In
fact, they questioned the patriotism of those who tried to caution them not to
write off Bangladesh’s land transit and security cards without receiving from
India what Bangladesh legitimately expected on sharing of the waters of the
common rivers; on bilateral trade; a ratified LBA and stopping the massacre of
innocent Bangladeshis in the border by the Indian BSF.
The
promises and prospects about which the Bangladesh negotiators had harped from
2009 to 2011 after Sheikh Hasina had taken the courageous decision to provide
India complete security assurance and a promise of land transit for a paradigm
shift of Bangladesh-India relations now appears like matters that had happened
ages ago. There was a time immediately after the disappointing visit of the
Indian Prime Minister when our negotiators and Ministers were telling us that
the TA would be signed in a few months after the document was withdrawn from
the agenda when the Indian Prime Minister visited Dhaka in September, 2011. The
Finance Minister said a few times that the Agreement would be signed in 3 to 4
months. The principal negotiators said likewise. The Indians took cover under
the diplomatic cliché “soon.” While the Indians knew that soon would never be
soon enough for Bangladesh and failed to be honest about it; our negotiators
and Ministers believed that the Indians would come back with MB and sign the TA
in 3 to 4 months. They also believed India would convince the BJP and the LBA
would be ratified.
Clearly,
the Bangladesh side negotiated with India in good faith without doing any homework at
all. Even a casual check on Mamata Banarjee and Trinamool politics would have
alerted Bangladesh negotiators that MB was not to be trusted. In fact, if they
had checked on MB through the Bangladesh Deputy High Commission in Kolkata,
they would have known that she could just not agree to the Teesta water sharing
agreement that New Delhi had promised because she was about to contest in a
bye-election to the Paschim Bangla Assembly from the constituency through which
the Teesta flows on the Paschim Bangla side. Likewise, our negotiators, had
they done their homework properly, would have known that the LBA that Manmohon
Singh signed in Dhaka was just a piece of paper because the BJP would not
support its ratification! The Indians knew but our negotiators heralded it as a
great achievement!
In
the backdrop of the failures to clinch the Teesta and the LBA deals, the much
heralded US 1 billion soft loan by India seems to have fallen by the way side
by default. One would like to hear from our negotiators about the current
status of these deals and agreements. Unfortunately, they seem to have gone
into hibernation. Nevertheless, like the cliché that every cloud has a silver
lining, what our negotiators, despite their efforts to highlight Indian
goodwill ahead of the courageous initiative of Sheikh Hasina notwithstanding,
have achieved a few positives. It has established in Bangladesh across the
political divide about the economic benefits of good relations with India
through connectivity. It has also established that India can have land transit
and security guarantee only on a quid pro quo basis for its legitimate demands
from India. The BNP has stated this categorically while the AL has learnt this
truth the hard way.
The
ball for improvement of Bangladesh-India relations is now in India’s court.
Despite the domestic problems, the Congress led government did not make serious
efforts to overcome these problems. It did not also properly explain to the
Banagladesh government these problems and still continues to take cover under
the cliché “soon.” Meantime, while there has been some progress on the border
killings and Tippaimukh Dam where the Indians have accepted a joint study,
there is depressing news that recently the Indians have decided to build two
more dams in Meghalaya on cross boundary rivers without discussing with
Bangladesh. The failure to move Sheikh Hasina’s initiative for a paradigm shift
in relations thus rests squarely on India’s shoulder. In fact, on its failure
to deliver to Bangladesh, India has been criticized in its own media and in the
international as well that it cannot be trusted.
The
writer is a retired career Ambassador
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